Dirty Linen, Fabrication, and the Authorities of Livy and Augustus*

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SUMMARY: At 4.20.5–11, Livy famously interrupts his narrative to report hearing that Augustus had discovered an inscribed linen corselet in the Temple of Jupiter Feretrius. The inscription, Livy tells us he has heard, said that A. Cornelius Cossus had dedicated the corselet as spolia opima when he was consul. Augustus’s story thus contradicts the account Livy has just related, in which Cossus dedicated spolia opima as military tribune. Livy’s treatment of Augustus’s testimony, I argue in the first part of this paper, associates this discovery with prominent episodes early in the Ab Urbe Condita in which persons of authority fabricate supernatural stories and use them to influence persons of lower status. The association distances Livy and his readers from Augustus’s account. This distancing, I argue in the paper’s second part, has implications for our understanding of Livy’s literary project and offers scope for reflection on the inter-relationship of historiographical and political authority at the beginning of the Principate.

LIVY’S REPORT OF AUGUSTUS’S ASSERTION THAT HE HAD DISCOVERED AN INSCRIBED LINEN CORSELET IN THE TEMPLE OF JUPITER FERETRIUS (4.20.5–11) HAS BEEN

* The arguments of this article have been much enhanced in several forums. The participants in my graduate seminar at the University of California, Los Angeles in Fall Quarter 2004 entertained, and helped me refine, many of the ideas, and audiences both there and at the University of California, Berkeley, offered numerous and useful suggestions and strictures. Early drafts profited from the comments of James Ker and of Leslie Kurke. Chris Kraus, Paul Allen Miller, and an anonymous referee for TAPA improved the article considerably in its expanded form. Brittany Powell at TAPA and Jared Hudson at Berkeley saved the last draft from a number of errors. I am happy to acknowledge their help and my gratitude, but must claim for myself all remaining inaccuracies, inanities, indiscretions, and infelicities. For ancient authors I cite the latest OCT except in these cases: for Liv. 41-45 I cite Briscoe’s Teubner; for Cic. Rep., Ziegler’s Teubner; for Sempronius Asellio, HRR; for Suetonius, Ihm’s Teubner; for Velleius, Watt’s Teubner. All translations are my own unless I have indicated otherwise.
at the center of all kinds of discussions of the *Ab Urbe Condita*. I aim to add to the conversation two new considerations. Livy’s presentation of Augustus’s “research,” I argue, associates it with episodes early in the work in which fabrication of supernatural stories is at issue. This association, I further show, stages an implicit competition of authority between Livy’s historiographical project and Augustus’s own status as a representer of Rome’s past.

In 4.18–19, during his narrative of 437, Livy has described a battle in which A. Cornelius Cossus, serving as military tribune under the dictator Mam. Aemilius, slew in single combat and stripped Lars Tolumnius, the king of Veii, and was awarded the right to deposit the spoils as *spolia opima* at the Temple of Jupiter Feretrius, as Romulus had first done (1.10.5–7). In 4.20, Livy reports the dedication ceremony, then, famously, interrupts the narrative to discuss Augustus’s new evidence (4.20):

(1) Omnibus locis re bene gesta, dictator senatus consulto iussuque populi triumphans in urbem reedit. (2) Longe maximum triumphi spectaculum fuit Cossus, spolia opima regis interfecit; in eum milites carmina incondita aequantes eum Romulo canere. (3) Spolia in aede Iovis Feretri prope Romuli spolia quae, prima opima appellata, sola ea tempestate erant, cum sollemni dedicatione dono fixit; averteratque in se a curru dictatoris civium ora et celebritatis eius diei fructum prope solus tulerat. (4) Dictator coronam auream, libram pondo, ex publica pecunia populi iussu in Capitolio Iovi donum posuit.

(5) Omnes ante me auctores secutus, A. Cornelium Cossum tribunum militum secunda spolia opima Iovis Feretri templum intulisse exposui; (6) ceterum, praeterquam quod ea rite opima spolia habentur, quae dux duci detractit, nec ducem novimus nisi cuius auspicio bellum geritur, titulus ipse spoliis inscriptus illos meque arguit consulum ea Cossum cepisse. (7) Hoc ego cum Augustum Caesarem, templorum omnium conditorem ac restitutorem, ingressum aedem Feretri Iovis quam vetustate dilapsam refecit, se ipsum in thorace linteo scriptum legisse audissim, prope sacrilegium ratus sum Cosso spoliorum suorum Caesarem, ipsius templi auctorem, subtrahere testem. (8) Quis ea in re sit error quod tam clara pugna in eum annum transferri posset, quod imbole triennium ferme pestilentia inopiaque frugum circa A. Cornelium consulem fuit, adeo ut quidam annales velut funesti nihil praeter nomina consulum suggererant. (10) Tertius ab consulatu Cossi annus tribunum eum militum consulari potestate habet, eodem anno magistrum equitum; quo in imperio alteram insignem equestrem edidit pugnamque equestrem. (11) Ea libera coniectura est sed, ut ego arbitror, vana. Versare in omnes opiniones licet, cum auctor pugnae, recentibus spoliis in sacra sede positis, lovem prope ipsum, cui vota erant, Romulumque
Everywhere victory was achieved, and the dictator by decree of the Senate and order of the people returned into the city in triumph. (2) Far the greatest spectacle of the triumph was Cossus, bearing the *spolia opima* of the king he had slain; it was to him that the soldiers sang their crude songs, comparing him to Romulus. (3) With due observance of ritual, he hung up the *spolia* as a dedication in the Temple of Jupiter Feretrius, near the *spolia* of Romulus that were the first, and at that time the only, ones called *opima*. He had distracted the gaze of the citizenry from the chariot of the dictator onto himself, and had been practically the only one to enjoy that day’s harvest of popularity. (4) At public expense and by order of the people, the dictator dedicated to Jupiter in the Capitolium a gold crown, one pound in weight.

(5) Following all authorities before me, I have reported that it was as a military tribune that A. Cornelius Cossus took the *spolia opima*, the second set ever dedicated, into the Temple of Jupiter Feretrius. (6) But beside the facts that those *spolia* are properly considered *opima* that a leader has taken from a leader, and that we do not recognize as a “leader” anyone but him under whose auspices a war is waged, the inscription itself written on the *spolia* has refuted them, and me, in showing that it was as consul that Cossus took them. (7) When I had heard that Augustus Caesar, founder and restorer of all temples, had gone into the Temple of Jupiter Feretrius, which had been dilapidated with age and which he repaired, and that he said that he had read this information written on a linen corselet, I thought it nearly sacrilege to deprive Cossus of Caesar, the author of the temple itself, as witness to his *spolia*. (8) What mistake lies behind the fact that annals so old and the linen books of the magistrates, which are stored in the Temple of Juno Moneta and which Licinius Macer cites repeatedly as authorities, have A. Cornelius Cossus as consul with T. Quinctius Poenus ten years later, anyone is free to decide. (9) For there is an additional obstacle to the possibility of so notable a battle being moved to that year: the three year period around the consulship of A. Cornelius was mainly without wars because of disease and dearth of grain, to the degree that certain annals, as though funereal, report nothing but the names of the consuls. (10) The third year from the consulship of Cossus has him as military tribune with consular power, and master of the horse the same year—in which command he showed forth a second notable performance in battle, this one a cavalry engagement. (11) This is free conjecture, but, to my mind, pointless. One may have any opinion on the matter one likes, though the author of the battle, as he put in their sacred home the spoils he had just taken, practically looking into the faces of Jupiter himself, to whom they had been vowed, and of Romulus—witnesses to a false inscription by no means to be taken lightly—wrote that he was A. Cornelius Cossus, consul.
Luce 1965 made the case that sometime between 27 and 25 B.C.E. Livy added 4.20.5–11 and 1.19.3 to an existing version of his first Pentad.¹ That article, often cited as conclusive, is not: these passages may be insertions, but only Book One need have been completed between 27 and 25.² For my purposes, it matters only that our passage presents a sequence: Livy’s version is presented as complete and seamless, and only after he has completed his narrative business do we hear of Augustus’s discovery. Indeed, the passage is so written that, even if it was indeed a later insertion, only readers aware that there had been an earlier version would have been able to read it as not “original”; on the other hand, any reader will have encountered Livy’s version as having an existence and integrity independent of and prior to (note 4.20.5, “all authorities before me”) the introduction of Augustus’s testimony, and as enjoying the claim of priority that narrative sequence confers.³ Whether or not the passage really was inserted, Livy presents it as something that can only be inserted, not accommodated within the narrative, an impression reinforced at 4.32.4, where Mam. Aemilius refers to Cossus as “that same fellow . . . who as a military tribune in the earlier war had slain Lars Tolumnius.”

An unlikely thing had happened recently when Livy composed 4.20.5–11. The connection drawn by Dessau between this event and Livy’s remarks has found few detractors.⁴ In 29 B.C.E., M. Licinius Crassus, grandson of the triumvir, consul the previous year, and now proconsul in Macedonia, had fought a battle against the Bastarnae and had slain and stripped their chieftain Deldo (Dio Cass. 51.24.3–4). A Roman commander had killed his opposite before, but rarely: beside Romulus and Cossus, there was only M. Claudius Marcellus

¹ Burton (bibliography on dating 430n4) has recently reasserted Luce’s conclusions and supplemented them with an inconclusive consideration. Badian 1993 corrected Luce’s key assumption that Augustus personally informed Livy of his discovery. Other important assumptions are, I would argue, distinctly wobbly.

² 1.19.3 must have been written after 16 January 27 B.C.E., when Octavian took the name Augustus. It was very probably written before 25, when Augustus presided over a second closing of the Temple of Janus: Livy mentions only one closing, and presumably would have referred to a second had one occurred.

³ For what it is worth, the author of the Periocha of Book Four took it as read that Cossus was tribunus militum.

⁴ Dessau established the connection between the report at Dio Cass. 51.24.3–4 that Crassus would have received the spolia opima had he been an autokrator strategos and that at Liv. 4.20.5–11 that Augustus had discovered the linen corselet dedicated by Cossus; important elaborations and reconsiderations are Syme 1959, Reinhold, Rich, Flower 2000 (with ample bibliography). The account has been repeated so often, in more or less the same words, that one almost feels like apologizing for reprising it; it is, however, indispensable to my argument.
in 222. The reward on these occasions was thought to have been the right to deposit the spoils at the Temple of Jupiter Feretrius, which Romulus was said to have built for that purpose. A general in triumph was supposed to be the most conspicuous man in Rome, but by comparison triumphs were common, as Cossus’s overshadowing of the dictator Mam. Aemilius shows. Plainly, no one alive in 29 had seen a dedication of the *spolia opima*, and the event’s rarity, combined with the martial virility it attested, promised to bathe the victor in glory. “The spirit of the times and the policy of the government encouraged the revival of ancient practices. This manifestation, however, was most distasteful to the young Caesar, who monopolised for himself all military glory and who, precisely in these years, aspired to the renown—and even to the name—of Romulus” (Syme 1959: 44). Two years before, the regime had emerged from a death-struggle with a formidable competitor for sole rule. Crassus might have no ambitions, but it was better not to take the chance. As Tacitus would later write, explaining Domitian’s anxiety about Agricola’s successes in Britain, “the excellence of a good general was a virtue for an emperor” (Ag. 39.2).

Octavian had to his credit a victory that ended long civil war, but had achieved it in civil war, while Crassus had killed a suitably foreign leader with a suitably odd name. Whether or not Crassus had ambitions, formal recognition of the feat would present a superlative Octavian could not match and would thus subtract from the general preeminence on which his reign was to rest.
And this happened just after Octavian had celebrated his triple triumph.\(^{11}\) We do not know whether Crassus applied to make the dedication; we do know Octavian presented evidence that meant Crassus was not eligible.\(^{12}\) Since Cossus was consul and thus fighting under his own auspices, Crassus, who had fought under Octavian’s auspices, had no precedent to dedicate *spolia opima*.\(^{13}\) Crassus had a triumph, was perhaps acclaimed *imperator*, but did not dedicate *spolia opima*; he then disappears to history.\(^{14}\)

Scholars have debated whether Octavian perpetrated a fraud, whether Livy means he did, what the passage has to say about a personal relationship between the historian and the *princeps*, and whether Livy is pro- or anti-Augustan. Miles’s perceptive treatment (47–54) argues that Livy frames the issue in careful balance, offering reasons why a reader might believe either the consul version or the tribune version, and leaves the reader to choose between them. By creating uncertainty, Livy, for Miles, undermines Augustus’s authority, but his own as well. For Miles, both the physical peril to which historians were subject and the modest social position of Livy himself recommend this strategy: it is not his place to speak out.\(^{15}\)

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\(^{11}\) The triumph took place 13–15 August: see Syme 1939, Reinhold 156–58 (with sources and bibliography), Gurval 19–36.

\(^{12}\) Dio Cass. 51.24.4 says only that he would have dedicated them had he been an *autokrator strategos*. Rich argues that he did not apply since he knew the regime would not approve. Flower 2000: 51–52 argues that application to the Senate would have been unnecessary, and that Crassus will instead have consulted the *pontifices*, among whom, of course, was Octavian (or Augustus, depending on when Crassus made his consultation).

\(^{13}\) Flower 2000: 52 argues that Crassus would have had *imperium* and his own *auspicium*, and that the issue must have been that he was not consul but only proconsul. Propertius’s *omine . . . certo* (4.10.46) as explicated by Harrison 411–12 combined with Livy’s specification of *auspicium* as the definition of a *dux* would, however, seem to indicate that the issue was indeed publicly understood to be about the auspices.


\(^{15}\) Miles may overestimate the peril to which writers of history under Augustus might have felt subject. See Toher 142–43 for the argument that “there is almost no significant evidence that free expression of ideas was seriously curtailed by Augustus” (142) (cf. also Timpe 1987: 72–73). But as Feeney 1992 points out, the limits of expression were constantly under negotiation. Harrison shows that Propertius and Vergil scrupulously
I agree that the choice between versions is left to the reader and that Livy’s presentation undercuts Augustus’s authority; I am less sure that it undercuts his own. The competing versions are not, I think, equally available, but rather, in order to accept one or the other, a reader must choose between two incompatible modes of belief. Livy casts his own version, I propose, as amenable to ordinary, business-as-usual belief in historical narrative, but in effect sacralizes Augustus’s version, showing that we can treat it as valid only if we assume a religious frame of mind open to accepting supernatural intervention in human affairs. He thus associates Augustus’s discovery with prominent episodes early in the work in which persons of authority are shown, or strongly suggested, to have fabricated supernatural events in order to pacify and make pliable persons of lesser status. Now, as has been widely recognized, Livy presents himself, especially in the early books, as rigorously skeptical about reports of direct divine intervention. While he and we, I will show, can approve of supernatural fictions in the past because the ruled needed to be lied to and it benefited Rome that they were, it is another matter for Augustus to attempt to impress a fiction on Livy and his readers because it implicitly puts them into the position of the rabble and of the ruled peoples of the empire. By suggesting fabrication in Augustus’s research, Livy demonstrates that he is not among the fooled, and gives his readers a way out of this social degradation as well. His resistance to Augustus’s story places his own auctoritas into competition with that of Augustus, and we can draw from this certain conclusions about the relationship between Livy’s authorial project, which has ambitions of being definitive, and Augustus’s historical work, which, wherever it differs from Livy’s, is an assertion that Livy’s work fails in its ambition, that is, that it is incomplete, incorrect, and subject to supersession.

I. DIRTY LINEN AND FABRICATION

Many have argued that there is something fishy about Augustus’s story, or that Livy means us to think there is, or both. I mean to show that Livy’s presentations of Augustus’s dubious method of inquiry and the suspicious circumstances of his discovery, in combination with the sacralizing language in which Livy couches Augustus’s version, allow us to think this passage alongside instances of religious fabrication early in his work. Augustus’s discovery becomes like Numa’s fictitious nocturnal meetings with the goddess Egeria, like the story of Romulus’s deification, and like the Romans’ attribution of their own origins to the god Mars.

reflect Augustus’s interpretation of the conditions under which spolia opima could be awarded; one might, but need not, take this as evidence of enforcement, or at least guidance.
Transmissions Sacred and Profane

Historiography was not a science, nor was there an elaborated theoretical discourse about it.¹⁶ A historian was, however, expected to have a standard operating procedure: to have authorities, to decide between them when they differed, and to employ a consistent set of practices in doing so. Now and then, Livy breaks the narrative to expose the process that produced it. He tells us he has chosen a version because it is supported by more authorities or by the oldest one, or because it seems more probable; he also concerns himself with the mendacity of particular historians.¹⁷ As we read, we develop a sense of his practice—what criteria he uses, and what not. The question of methodology is different from that of his actual practice, which scholars tend to reconstruct as lazy, ill-informed, and haphazard; to a reader not engaged in Quellenforschung and attentive to Livy’s pronouncements, he seems to operate scrupulously, on the basis of full coverage of the sources, and with a set of respectable, regularly-applied, and conventional criteria for deciding what enters the narrative.¹⁸

His description of the tradition of the tribune version is expressly consistent with his ordinary procedures, and he walks us through his application of them in this case. Our passage invokes one criterion, the number of authorities (omnes ante me auctores), and implies a second, both in calling the annalistic sources “so very old” and in referring to the libri lintei that were themselves auctores for one of the annalists, Licinius Macer.¹⁹ Livy here emphasizes univocality among conventional sources as the nearest thing to a guarantee of a narrative’s reliability; he might have trundled out the various transgressions that in other passages he attaches to his predecessors and

¹⁶ No elaborated theoretical discourse: Collingwood 14–45, Wiseman 1987. Woodward 1988 is the classic statement of the case that ancient historiography is to be seen as a genre of rhetoric and not a “scientific” endeavor. Fornara 91–141 discusses what there was in the way of theorization.

¹⁷ On Livy’s interruptions, see Miles 8–74, Jaeger 1999: 179. Kraus 1994a: 13 usefully characterizes Livy as “veer[ing] between . . . perfect unchallenged mimesis . . . and . . . show[ing] the seams of the text.” It would then not be quite right to say, as does Jal 33–34, that Livy wishes to conceal as many as possible of the traces of his work of composition; rather, he reveals them judiciously. For a taxonomy of ancient historiography’s criteria for deciding between variants, see Marincola 280–86. On probability as a criterion of Livy’s: Luce 1977: 141, Forsythe 52–64.


sources, but, crucially, he does not do so.\textsuperscript{20} The tribune version, moreover, has an ordinary genealogy: it goes from the act Cossus “authored” to its commemoration in the \textit{libri lintei}, to the annalists’ records, to Livy’s text. The transmission is chronologically and causally unidirectional: the earlier account unambiguously causes the succeeding one. Though this is rarely made explicit, Livy’s occasional interventions imply that in his work such a chain of transmission lies behind each event he records; and such a chain is at any rate the operation envisioned by the concept of \textit{traditio} that informs all Roman historiography.\textsuperscript{21}

The consul version’s transmission could have been represented similarly: Cossus authored his deed, then recorded it in writing on the corselet, then Augustus handed it on to the public record, whence Livy took it. But in Livy’s presentation, the account of this transmission confounds orderly sequence. Augustus here is not just one link in the chain of transmission, but retroactively replaces earlier links. In the first place, he takes over the corselet’s role. We are initially told that the inscription itself has proved Livy and the other \textit{auctores} wrong (6), then that Livy has hesitated to take away Augustus, not the inscription, as witness (7). And he was not simply “reluctant” to “deprive Cossus of his witness” but felt it to be “practically temple-robbery” to “steal

\textsuperscript{20} Shortly after our passage, at 4.23.1–3, Livy reports chaos among the authorities. Valerius Antias and Aelius Tubero have one college of consuls for 434, and Licinius Macer another. Both Tubero and Macer cite the \textit{libri lintei} as their authority, but both acknowledge that earlier writers say that there had been \textit{no} consuls that year, but rather military tribunes. Macer, Livy says, is content to follow the \textit{libri lintei}, while Tubero is uncertain of the truth. Livy follows Tubero: 4.23.3, \textit{sit inter cetera vetustate cooperta hoc quoque in incerto positum}. Livy is clearly at times ready to acknowledge the impossibility of certain knowledge (cf. Wiseman 1993: 135, citing Sen. \textit{Nat.} 4b.3.1, on historians using occasional expressions of skepticism in order to give the impression of broader reliability). One of the two previous appearances of Macer and his \textit{libri lintei} (4.7.10–12) disposes us favorably towards them: there Livy accepts Macer’s testimony that the \textit{libri}, together with the text of a treaty with Ardea, have consuls in 444, and reconciles it with the testimony of the \textit{annales prisci} and the \textit{libri magistratuum} that there were military tribunes, not consuls. The other earlier passage (4.13.7) does not pronounce on the reliability of the \textit{libri lintei}.

\textsuperscript{21} Scholars have faulted Livy for not personally inspecting the corselet or the \textit{libri lintei}. But this is to mistake the foundations of the legitimacy of Livy’s text: it is valid not because it includes all conceivable testimony and eschews the later materials in the literary tradition for the early but because it covers all of the literary tradition, early and late. Cássola suggests that access to the Temple of Jupiter Feretrius may have been restricted and autopsy thus out of the question.
Augustus.”22 The unprecedented name “Augustus,” too, suggests “something beyond human” and must still have been striking when this passage was composed, not long after the Senate voted him the name.23 Augustus himself thus becomes the sacred object set up in the temple, and his testimonial value is not just as witness to, but also as a metaphorical substitute for, the corselet.

Augustus takes over the previous link as well. He is witness to the spolia, but that is not so simple as it seems. It means, to be sure, “saw that the corselet was there.” But its essential force, in context, is “read the inscription and vouches that it is true that the office Cossus held was the consulship and that the corselet therefore qualifies as spolia opima,” which it would not do had Cossus not been consul. Augustus, that is, is not just witness to the object’s presence but also guarantees the truth of the historical conditions that allowed the object to be spolia opima. Livy’s reluctance to take away Augustus’s testimony implies that to do so would harm Cossus, by ignoring the crucial evidence that Cossus had been consul and that his spoils had therefore been spolia opima. But Augustus’s testimony is manifestly a solution to a crisis precipitated only by the testimony itself: we already know that all previous versions were in seamless agreement, and everyone knew, until Augustus’s testimony, that Cossus had dedicated the spolia opima. Only because of Augustus’s research has this section of Livy’s text come into existence, and only with this section has the idea been entertained that Cossus was not a dux, which would mean that, whatever he did that day, it was not to win the spolia opima.24 Augustus thus displaces both the corselet as record of the deed and Cossus as witness to his own office at the time of his feat.25

22 Cf. OLD s.v. sacrilegium and Mensching 26–29. Cf. Walsh 1961a: 36n46, “Livy means that to remove Caesar as witness would be the equivalent of robbing the shrine of the corselet—which would be a sacrilegium, a sacred theft.” For Walsh, this seems to mean that Augustus is thereby not made sacred, which is to deny the suggestive power of metaphor.


24 Varro knew a version according to which the rank of the Roman did not matter, only that of the foreign leader (Fest. p. 204L). The words Livy gives Romulus seem to demand that the terms under which spolia opima could be won would be subject to redefinition: “haec . . . Romulus rex regia arma fero” (cf. 4.20.6, dux duci detraxit). A rex had made only the first of the three canonical dedications.

25 In the same way that Augustus penetrates the sequence that precedes his discovery, the specifics of the post-discovery transmission, too, become irrelevant: all that matters is that Augustus is somewhere in the sequence. The construction. Augustum . . . se ipsum . . . legisse audisset has at best a tenuous claim to be Latin; editors have rightly been
The phrase *ipsius templi auctorem* suggests a similar, apparently retroactive effect on the transmission. The reference to Augustus’s restoration has been taken as a gesture to his *pietas* that establishes his good character and so strengthens his credibility. But it is not just a general pronouncement on Augustus’s personal qualities: rather, it bears on his unique role in the discovery and forms part of Livy’s reasoning for not “depriving Cossus of Augustus as witness.” By no means is it clear that Augustus’s creative involvement in the re-making of the temple should put us at ease. To ask, “How can I contradict the person who is the sole reason for the temple’s existence?” is not just to introduce a consideration extraneous to the sequence of transmission. It is to suggest a reversal of that sequence, with Augustus’s re-origination of a temple that was already there acting as apparent license also to re-originate history already in place. It is significant, too, that Livy uses the word *auctor*, not just because it adds to the abundance of *auctores* in the passage (Livy’s sources [6], Livy by implication himself [6], Augustus [7], *the libri lintei* [8], Cossus himself [11]). What the builder of a temple was doing at Rome was often unclear: a founder of a new cult was clearly a *conditor*, but was someone who restored a structure its new founder or merely its restorer, its *restitutor*? Livy uses both words earlier in the sentence to distinguish between new and refurbished structures, but here uses an expression that suggests a new start. Augustus’s originating involvement intensifies the sense of difference between the geneses of the tribune and the consul stories. So does his unique infallibility among the *auctores* mentioned: the inscription has proven Livy and his *auctores* wrong (*arguit*, 6), there is an error in the annals or the *libri lintei* (8), and even Cossus is, ever so tentatively, imagined falsifying his own troubled and have either emended or insisted that we understand a *dicentem* “I had heard Augustus saying.” But Badian 1993: 14–16 has shown that we might as well understand an infinitive (*dicere* or *dixisse*) as a participle, “I had heard that Augustus said that he had read.” The difference would be that in one case the story had passed from Augustus’s lips to Livy’s ears, and in the other that there was an intermediate link, or links, in the transmission, from Augustus to another party or parties and eventually to Livy. This linguistic breakdown might make sense as a realization of Augustus’s infiltration into the whole tradition—once Augustus is a link in the chain, the number and character and relationship between the other links do not matter.

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26 Miles 43, but cf. 57: “When he calls attention to the piety of Augustus, on whose authority he reports the inscription, Livy . . . acknowledges that belief in the inscription rests entirely on Augustus’s word.”
27 Cf. Daly 53–54.
28 Cf. Miles 125.
inscription (11). Augustus receives an improbable exemption (the Latin word would be *venia*) from Livy’s otherwise universal willingness to consider error or falsification.

Livy’s reasoning for reporting the consul version establishes that, in order to believe it, one has to shift from a rationalizing historiographical mode into a frame of mind able to discount the features of the story that defy rationalism.

The declaration that he felt it nearly a *sacriilegium* to deprive Cossus of Augustus as witness implies that that is what he would have done, had the version not been sacred. His toleration of Augustus’s testimony is thus figured as a product of *religio*, a supernaturally charged feeling of restraint. *Religio* implies that an imagined action would seem desirable and recommended absent the feeling that it is divinely forbidden. To invoke *religio* is, in other words, to declare all other considerations null and void, but it is also to say that, absent the restraint, those considerations are present and valid. If Augustus’s authority coursing back, despite the unidirectionality of time, through the chain of transmission does not persuade us that his version demands a religious mechanism of belief, Livy’s invocation of reluctance to commit a near-*sacriilegium* seals it.

The tribune version also distinguishes itself from the consul version through the absence of any obvious reason for it to have come into being in error (this is suggested by Livy’s aporia about *quis ea in re sit error*). He gives Augustus opportunity, though, and motive. Without a witness, Augustus enters the temple like a priest consulting an oracle or an initiate into the mysteries, and emerges with his story. The sentences 4.20.1–4 that precede the report of

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30 Levene 171 sees a “strongly religious tone” in the passage and tentatively suggests that Livy uses it “not only because of its appropriateness to Augustus, but also because it links well to the themes of the main story [i.e. the religiously-framed narrative of the war with Veii], and so helps dovetail in a somewhat awkward addition.”

31 Burck 1992: 166–67 offers a different explanation: “Das Wort *sacriilegium* hat sich offenbar eingestellt, da Augustus gleichsam aus dem Tempel heraus gesprochen hat und der *restitutor* dieses Tempels mit dem obligaten Hüter des Heiligtums gleichgesetzt wird” (“The word *sacriilegium* evidently appears here because Augustus spoke, as it were, “from the temple,” and the *restitutor* of this temple gets equated with the obligatory guardian of the shrine”).

32 Cf. OLD s.v. *religio*. Ancient discussions of *religio* at Cic. ND 2.28 (72), Gel. 4.9.

33 *Quis* is Gronovius’s conjecture; the MSS have *qui si*.

34 Càssola argues that access to Jupiter Feretrius was limited to certain priesthoods. Syme 1959 (followed by Ogilvie 1965 ad loc.) asserts that Atticus accompanied Octavian into the temple (Atticus had suggested the restoration: Nep. Att. 20.3). Syme was sure Augustus had committed a fraud. But provision of Atticus’s company serves Ogilvie’s refusal even to entertain the idea that Augustus was aware of, much less perpetrated, a fraud. The arms of Augustus’s *auctoritas* are long indeed.
Augustus’s discovery blare motive: Cossus’s dedication of the *spolia* obscured even the awesome figure of a *triumphator* and *dictator*, that is, a person who, one would think, already stood at the outer limit of conspicuousness. Here one may think of the triple triumph Octavian had celebrated the same year as Crassus’s feat. Closing the section is the suggestive image, dismissed as soon as it appears, of Cossus in the temple, practically looking into the faces of Jupiter and of Romulus as he produces a *falsus titulus*—a “false inscription” in that it contains the untrue information that he was *consul*. *Falsus*, however, means not only “containing false information” but also “fraudulent” or “sham.” And the gerundive that seems to express an imperative Cossus could only obey (“they ought not to be scorned [and so he could not have]”) might as well express an imperative that he, or anyone else, had ignored (“they ought not to be scorned [and so shame on whoever did]”). The potential religious offence at issue might not be Livy’s *sacrilegium*, and it might not be Cossus’s *periurium*—it might be one of Augustus himself.

Religio is the key to leaving the consul version unquestioned and Augustus’s fabrication unthought. Livy did not need to register Augustus’s testimony in this way: it could have been left unsacralized and without the constructions highlighting inconsistency and the possibility of bad faith. One could object that perhaps Livy invokes, or Augustus had himself invoked, the sacred precisely in order to bolster Augustus’s version. Rome was after all not populated with Voltaires, and if one depicted an event as shot through with divine involvement, one was not self-evidently making it preposterous, but rather perhaps signaling its importance and validity. If we allow for habitual Roman discourse about the gods and its robust capacity for thinking things incompatible with stringent rationalism, it might indeed seem that Livy presents two balanced sets of arguments, one each in favor of each version.

Power, Authority, Belief

In Livy, however, the supernatural looks rather different from how it appeared in Roman society more broadly. In this section, I begin from the general rec-
ognition that Livy regularly presents himself as skeptical about supernatural events, in particular early in his work. I argue that this skepticism is more robust and consistent than has recently been allowed, and that the reason for its rigor is that the question of belief and skepticism is wrapped up with issues of social distinction: those in power are repeatedly shown using stories of the supernatural to control those below them. To believe in fictions that are produced in order to control the *multitudo* or the ruled peoples of the empire thus becomes to place oneself notionally into their position. Livy can, then, approve of religious fictions used in a socially constructive way, but, in each case, he demonstrates that he himself is aware of their fictitiousness, exactly because not to be aware of it is a mark of social degradation. Livy’s solicitude early in the work to demonstrate his own capacity not to believe in the stories in which the mob believes then informs, I will argue, the way in which a reader approaches Livy’s account of Augustus’s testimony.

Beard 1986 has argued that Cicero’s *de Divinatione* presents traditional and rationalistic discourses as organic wholes and shows them to be mutually inconsistent, but nonetheless does not cause them to cancel each other out. This feature of the work, in her account, betrays a real development of rationalistic discourse among the elite that nonetheless had not displaced traditional discourse. There has been contention over whether Livy’s text reflects the one or the other mode of thinking, and it has been a crucial contribution of Levene to demonstrate that Livy by turns reflects both and allows the reader to decide how to think about the involvement of the gods in human affairs. His argument, though, leaves intact (25) earlier scholars’ important findings that in his early books Livy, with few exceptions, relegates reports of the supernatural to indirect discourse with *ferunt, dicitur, habetur*, and so forth.

39 Beard 1986. The dialogue may not be as open-ended as Beard suggests: I find convincing the arguments of Krostenko, who suggests that the dialogue works toward a “purely formal and symbolic” divinatory practice “detached from questions of belief and immune to the probes of skepticism” (376) and ties the desirability of this kind of practice to the aim of maintaining elite rule and creating harmony within that elite. On rationalism in the late Republic, see e.g. Liebeschuetz 1979: 29–39, Linderski 1982, Rawson 1985: 298–316, Levene 10–13, Beard 1994: 756–57, Moati (esp. 173–83), Feeney 1998: 12–46 (on belief). On Livy’s rationalistic moments, see Levene 16–33. Davies rejects “rationalism” as a descriptive category on grounds of anachronism, but I think that responsibly historicizing scholarship has indeed demonstrated the existence of rationalistic discourse at Rome.


41 Kajanto, Walsh 1961b: 47–48, Burck 1964b: 136–37, Liebeschuetz 29–39. For an attempt to give these constructions a different significance, see Davies.
It has long been recognized that Livy in the earliest books takes a consistently distanced approach to the intervention of *di praesentes* in historical events.\(^{42}\) A good index of his discomfort is his account of the Tarquin boys’ consultation of the Delphic Oracle (1.56.4–13). He has Titus and Arruns ask who will rule at Rome and then writes “they say that a voice came back in answer from the depths of the cave.” He is not merely hesitant to say that the voice was divine but actually refuses even to confirm that there was a voice (1.56.10). By the time we encounter the Cossus passage, we have been taught, when confronting the historicity of supernatural occurrences, to treat them as someone else’s story, not as Livy’s, and so, if we use Livy as our *exemplum*, not as our own.\(^{43}\)

This skepticism appears at prominent points where stories about the supernatural operate within the framework of political power. In his trailblazing book, Feldherr 51–81 argues that in Livy *imperatores* have what amounts to the capacity to make truth: they create stories that others treat as fact and act upon accordingly, thus retroactively making those stories valid despite their origin in invention. These acts of truth-making as a rule serve the good of the community, by inculcating useful states of mind in the stories’ consumers, so that they behave in a civilized manner, for example, or fight with the confidence of divine support. Feldherr connects this function of *imperium* to the narrative-making power of Livy himself and argues that Livy’s history aims at a similar community-building effect. This argument captures an essential feature of the ways in which power and stories of the supernatural work in Livy, and I wish to build from it. I do, however, hesitate to imagine Livy’s reader and Livy accepting the truth-value of several important episodes of this type. Since these stories are marked as products designed for the consumption of the pre-Republican mob and the ruled peoples of the empire, acceptance of the validity of the stories on their own account—as opposed to their utility—becomes nearly unthinkable. When a reader sees persons of relatively higher status deliberately producing stories that are marked as false, and persons of relatively lower status uncritically accepting these stories as *not* false, his sense of his own place within Roman society is activated and he is shown that the price of not being aware of the fictitiousness of the stories is to identify with the mob. It will be helpful to look at several famil-

\(^{42}\) Cf. Walsh 1961b: 47–48; see Forsythe 40–51 for Livy’s general “caution towards the historical traditions of early Rome” (40) and 87–98 for his “nearly uniform pattern of qualifying marvelous events” (89). The question of impersonal involvement of the gods in Roman history is another question: cf. the thoughtful overview of Forsythe 91–93.

\(^{43}\) On Livy as exemplary reader, cf. Wheelon 56–57. The preface (4–5, 9) is deeply concerned with defining for his readers legitimate and illegitimate avenues of approach to the text.
piar passages in which the relationship between power, authority, and belief is explicitly at stake: the nocturnal trysts of Numa with the goddess Egeria, the story of the deification of Romulus, and the Romans’ own story of their descent from Mars.

Numa. Under Romulus, Romans had been wild and violent, but Numa had made peace with Rome’s neighbors (1.19.2). The metus hostilis gone and the Romans tamed by peace, Numa desired to prevent luxuria:

The first item on the agenda, he judged, was to inspire fear of the gods, a very useful thing for the ignorant and (in those times) uncivilized masses. Since he could not reach them without some fabricated source of wonder, he pretended (simulat) to have trysts by night with the goddess Egeria—it was, he said, at her advising that he instituted the rites that would most please the gods, and that he set individual priesthoods in charge of each god’s cult.44

This worked well: building temples and performing rites distracted the masses from their former violence, and (1.21.1):

the constant, pressing concern for the gods—since a supernal divine power seemed to be present amidst the life of mortals—had impressed upon their hearts such pietas that trust and oaths, rather than the fear of laws and punishments, ran the state.45

The effects of Roman concern for res divinae then radiate to the surrounding peoples, making them unwilling to attack a city so pious (1.21.2). Numa, for Romans’ benefit, not his own, devises and propagates a fiction. Romans believe it, act on it, and are better off for doing so.46

44 1.19.4–5. Cf. also Numa’s creation of the calendar: 1.19.7 nefastos dies fastosque fecit quia aliquando nihil cum populo agi utile futurum erat.

45 The Platonic “noble lie” is often cited as a comparandum for Numa’s fiction: see R. 3.414–415d, with history of the idea in the Greek and Roman contexts and bibliography at Linderski 1982: 20n16.

46 Fox 114 contrasts Romulus’s desire for power (1.8.2) with Numa’s aim “to help his people remain strong through their communal faith.” In a comparable moment (1.12.7), Romulus, attempting to stay the Roman flight, vows a temple to Jupiter Stator; then, Livy writes: Hae precatus, veluti si sensisset auditas preces, “Hinc,” inquit, “Romani, Iuppiter optimus maximus resistere atque iterate pugnam iubet.” Restitere Romani tamquam caelestis voce iussi. (For the use of tamquam see OLD tamquam 7b.) The Romans, confident Jupiter is on their side, go on to win the battle. Cf. Levene 132: “Livy nowhere indicates that Romulus’s prayers had genuinely received a divine response: the implication of the passage is rather that he is using religion in order to improve his troops’ morale by appealing to religious feelings in them.”
Romulus and Procullus Julius. Comparable issues surround the reports of Romulus’s deification (1.16.1–8).\textsuperscript{47} He had been addressing a contio when suddenly a cloud obscured him; when it cleared, he was gone. The Roman youth, even if it believed the witness of the patres that he had been borne up on high by a gust of wind, was still distressed (1.16.2). A few, and then all, hailed him as god born of a god (1.16.3). Livy then intervenes (1.16.4):

Even then I think that there were those who secretly claimed the king had been torn apart at the hands of the senators—for this report has come down to us as well, but very darkly; that other report was given pride of place by admiration of the man, and the fear felt at the time.

The story differs from the one about Numa. We are not told outright that the patres were guilty, but they are given unique opportunity and much motive: the passage leading into Romulus’s disappearance explains that he was popular with the masses and especially with the army, and that he had been going about, even in peacetime, in the company of armed bodyguards (1.15.8). Livy emphasizes that the divine version did not prevail through the patres’ authority or any evidence, but because translation seemed to suit Romulus’s life (“admiration of the man”) and appealed to public panic in a desperate moment (“the fear felt at the time”). Finally, Livy’s framing of the story fits awkwardly with the patres’ version. He has, four sentences earlier, referred to Romulus’s “supposed divinity after he had died” (divinitatis . . . post mortem creditae, 1.15.6) while the patres’ story seems to presuppose that Romulus had not died, but simply traveled vertically to join the other immortals.\textsuperscript{48} Though we can understand why Romans of the time believed the patres then, it is hard to see why we should, and, if we do not, the perobscura fama becomes very attractive, and thus the deification seems likely to have been a self-serving fiction the patres authored.\textsuperscript{49} That impression, too, distinguishes this story from Numa’s—here the patres seem to tell their story not for the general benefit but to protect themselves from the army.

\textsuperscript{47} Classen 28n28 collects versions according to which Romulus ascended to heaven and 28n29 versions according to which the senators murdered him.

\textsuperscript{48} Post excessum was an obvious and less problematic alternative to post mortem. Fox 110 observes that, despite the declaration (1.15.6) haec ferme Romulo regnante domi militiaeque gesta, quorum nihil absonum fidei divinae originis divinitatisque post mortem creditae fuit, Livy’s Romulus is a notably mundane figure.

\textsuperscript{49} There is more here than the “ambivalence” Miles 103 detects. I do not understand why Weeber 332 declares that Livy characterizes the “senatorenfeindliche Version” as “wenig vertrauenerweckend” and that he “dismisses” (“abqualifiziert”) it as a perobscura fama.
The patres’ story, Livy has explained, gained currency, yet the civitas remains, as though it believed the other story, “enraged with the patres.” Since there has never yet been strife reported between patres and plebs, from the foundation till now, and since the patres have done nothing since they announced Romulus’s translation, the only available explanation for their anger is that they blame the patres for Romulus’s disappearance. In response, Proculus Julius comes forward to announce Romulus’s descensio (1.16.5–8):

And by the devising of one man alone, as well, credibility is said to have been imparted to the matter. For, the community shaken as it was by longing for its king, and enraged with the patres, Proculus Julius, an authority (such is the tradition) to be taken seriously about anything no matter how great, came forward to address the people. “Citizens of Rome,” he said, “Romulus, the father of this city, at first light today came suddenly down from on high and stood before me. In shock and veneration I went before him and entreated him that I might be permitted to behold him. ‘Go,’ he said, ‘and announce to the Romans that it is the will of the gods that my Rome should be head of the world; let them then practice the arts of war, and let them know and hand on to succeeding generations that no human power can resist the arms of Rome.’ When he had spoken thus,” he said, “he went up on high.”

As Wiseman notes (2002: 334), “by the devising” “clearly implies that it was a piece of deliberate policy.” Furthermore, we might point to Livy’s assertion that “Romulus was thenceforth not on earth” (1.16.1) as inconsistent with Proculus Julius’s story that he had, only just now, been on earth. Although Proculus Julius’s story too has the air of fiction, he, unlike the patres, manages to satisfy his audience (1.16.8):

It is astonishing the degree of credence that was given the man when he made his announcement, and how the longing for Romulus among the plebs and the army was diminished once belief in his immortality had been effected.

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50 In the scholarship, the anger of the civitas tends to be ignored, and its sense of ruderness emphasized: cf. e.g. the summary of the passage at Weeber 331.

51 Cf. Burck 1964b: 145: “Livius selbst glaubt nicht an die Erscheinung des Romulus, sondern hält das Ganze für ein consilium eines Menschen” (Livy himself does not believe in the apparition of Romulus, but rather considers the whole affair to be a consilium of one man”). It is then unfair to say, as does Alfonsi 99, that Livy is uninterested in the truth or fabulousness of Proculus Julius’s story and that he is “perplesso” about the affair.

52 1.16.8, mirum quantum illi viro nuntianti haec fides fuerit, quamque desiderium Romuli apud plebem exercitumque facta fide immortalitatis lenitum sit. I do not agree with Liebeschuetz 33n6 that “Livy makes clear that [Romulus] is a god” or (73n3) that Livy “takes [Proculus Julius’s testimony] entirely seriously.”
In other versions, Proculus Julius is a farmer, or an Alban in Rome for the day.\textsuperscript{53} Livy strips him of status and origin, reporting only that he is said to have been of unlimited \textit{auctoritas}.\textsuperscript{54} Making Proculus Julius an outsider would tie his credibility to his lack of a stake in the community: since it is nothing to an Alban whether the people of Rome hate the \textit{patres}, why should his story not be true? Livy instead focuses the issue around his esteem in the community and makes it not about disinterestedness but about the operation of benevolent \textit{auctoritas} in a crisis. Proculus Julius comes forward out of a desire to assuage the pain and anger of the populace, and the apparent fabrication of Romulus’s \textit{descensio} is thus made salutary.\textsuperscript{55} With the addition of Proculus Julius, who explicitly works by his own lights (not, as Cicero \textit{Rep.} 2.20.3 has it, \textit{impulsu patrum}), the self-interestedness of the \textit{patres’} story does not change, but we are shown that it is better for the community that the populace believe the \textit{patres’} story.\textsuperscript{56}

For at stake here is the character and future of the Roman state itself. Strife between mass and elite, as we have seen, had not arisen by the time of Romulus’s disappearance; more than that, so long as Rome is under the

\textsuperscript{53} Cic. \textit{Rep.} 2.20, Ov. \textit{Fast.} 2.499; on the variants, see Zetzel ad 2.20.3. For the argument that Proculus Julius was an early invention of the \textit{gens Iulia} intended to give it an important role in the Romulus story despite its Alban origin, see Ogilvie 1965 ad 1.16; for the argument that the equation of Romulus and Quirinus that Proculus Julius reports in Cicero (\textit{se deum esse et Quirinum vocari}) was a cultic innovation of Caesar, see Classen 41–44 (this does not require that Proculus Julius be Caesar’s invention).

\textsuperscript{54} We are not reminded until 1.30.2, and then in passing, that the Julii were not Roman but Alban before the reign of Tullus Hostilius; it is hard to say, despite Proculus Julius’s \textit{cognomen} (which means “born while one’s father was away” not “from far away”: cf. Ogilvie 1965 ad 1.16.5), whether a reader will have assumed that he was not Roman. It does not suffice with Ogilvie 1965 ad loc. to attribute Livy’s silence about Proculus Julius’s status and origin to “[Livy’s] usual desire not to complicate a story by distracting details.”

\textsuperscript{55} Weeber 333 assumes that we know that Proculus Julius is a Roman senator and that we therefore know that his \textit{consilium} is self-serving.

\textsuperscript{56} There may be an allusion in “by the devising of one man alone” (\textit{consilio \ldots unius hominis}) to Cic. \textit{Rep.} 2.11.21, \textit{videtisne igitur unius viri [sc. Romuli] consilio non solum ortum novum populum, neque ut in cunabulis vagi\textit{entem relictum, sed adultum iam et paene puberem}! Livy transfers the crucial contribution that stabilizes the early Roman community from Romulus’s political activity to Proculus Julius’s testimony. The scholarship is loud about the influence on Livy of Cicero’s stylistic prescriptions (cf. McDonald, Woodman 1988: 139–40), but, so far as I know, has little to say about whether Cicero’s representation of archaic Rome in \textit{de Re Publica} or the discussion of poetry and history that opens \textit{de Legibus} has affected Livy’s preface or the narrative of Book One. Cornell 2001 emphasizes the differences between the two authors’ representations.
monarchy in Livy, such strife is rare, *interregna* being the exceptions that prove the rule.\(^{57}\) It is, by contrast, one of the organizing themes of Livy’s narrative after the expulsion of the kings, and one of the least appealing features of the Republican constitution, requiring regular exorcism via prudent leadership and salutary struggle against external foes. The difference between the pre-Republican and Republican multitudes is *libertas*: the *plebs* under the kings is not yet an aggregate of autonomous, “adult” free citizens, but rather closer, because of their lack of freedom, to children, to the other non-Roman peoples of the world, and to slaves.\(^{58}\) So long as *fides* about Romulus’s divinity is withheld, Rome risks a perilous premature birth of the Republic, with *patres* and *plebs* at each others’ throats long before completion of the process of making the *plebs* feel they are Roman, a process Livy identifies as the regal period’s crucial contribution to Roman history (2.1.1–6).\(^{59}\) Proculus Julius by consoling the people and army averts a contention between *ordines* that could be survived only when the *plebs* would possess a sense of common Romanness with the *patres* to which appeal could be made.\(^{60}\)

In one sense, then, what matters is not the contents of Romulus’s putative message, but that Romulus in fact appeared, that he came from and returned to the heavens, and that he did not report having been torn to shreds by the *patres*. But his words matter a good deal in another sense. The internal strife that loomed only just now is by Romulus’s exhortation to empire redirected outwards, against non-Romans, just as it will often be in Livy’s narrative of the Republic; the imperial project thus becomes not only the means for distracting attention from the fiction, but itself justifies the fiction, in that only by the *multitudo’s fides* in Proculus Julius’s story does empire, not civil war, become Rome’s future.

\(^{57}\) Cf. the first *interregnum* in 1.17 with Fox 112. The discontent of the *plebs* at Tarquinius Superbus’s onerous building program (1.56.1–2, 1.57.1–2) is directed towards the king, not the *patres*, and so the *plebs* is in that episode actually in sympathy with elite disaffection towards the Tarquins.

\(^{58}\) On the incomplete *libertas* of the early Republican *plebs* in Livy, see Bruno 1966b. Henderson 1998: 317 cites Lactant. *Inst. Div.* 7.15.14 on Seneca’s *Histories*, which saw the regal period as Rome’s “infancy” and thus the Republic as its adulthood.

\(^{59}\) Fox 122 sees “clear parallels between what Livy says would have happened with premature liberty at 2.1, and the picture of the interregnum.” Cf. Fox 96–141, Vasaly 285.

\(^{60}\) Cf. Luce 1977: 244 “The Roman character was something that required time and manipulation to achieve” and Henderson 1998: 317, “is Book I a preface to Rome as *res publica*, Rome only becoming Rome with the *res publica libera* and its consuls in II?” But the *patres* have been “Roman” from the start; it is the *plebs* (2.1) that needs to be Romanized.
Romans are from Mars: the Paternity of Romulus and the Loop of Imperium. Rome’s imperial future is central to the next supernatural story I wish to confront. In his preface, Livy recuses himself from pronouncing on the truth or falsehood of the stories from before or during the foundation of the city that are more suited to the fabulae of poets than to uncorrupted monuments of res gestae (praef. 6). Antiquity, he tells us, receives an exemption (venia) to make the beginnings of cities more august by mingling human and divine (praef. 7). He then singles out the populus Romanus as one city that has availed itself of, and has better claim than any other to, this exemption (praef. 7):

If it is appropriate that any people be allowed to make sacred (consecrare) its own origins and to attribute (referre) them to the gods as auctores, the glory in war of the people of Rome is such that when it claims (ferat) in particular as its own father, and as the father of its founder, Mars, the peoples of the world endure this, too, without distress, just as they endure its imperium.

The argument at first seems to be that empirical evidence of Rome’s military distinction leads the peoples of the world to conclude that the god of war had a hand in the city’s origin. That impression changes with the phrase “just as they endure its imperium.” The peoples of the earth, assessing from Rome’s conquests its claim to divine origin, do not observe its gloria objectively; rather, they look up at glorious Rome as it is standing on them. They endure the story not because they behold Rome’s imperium as an impressive phenomenon but because they are within Rome’s imperium, that is, take orders from Rome, that is, are told by Rome how things are and how things will be. Imperium does, it is true, differ from auctoritas: it is not a portable, personal quality but a temporary possession; it is specifically military, operating within formalized structures of command; and it bears the weight of sanction when it is ignored. It is, however, intimately related to auctoritas: both terms refer to the ability

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61 On the preface see Moles and the literature cited there at 162n2, to which add now Miles 14–20, 76–79, 176–78; Feldherr 1–50, 75–78, 218–25.

62 Cf. Moles 149: the patiuntur conceit “foregrounds the “martial” element of the Roman character and it sets up a hierarchy: humans in general; the rest of the human race; the Roman imperial race; the gods.”

63 Cf. Miles 138–39, “the claim of divine ancestry is justified here not because of its literal truth but rather because it appropriately symbolizes the martial accomplishments of the Romans, who, whatever the reality of their origins, have the ability to compel others to accede to that claim.” See also Feldherr 75–78.
to make statements that will be taken as valid and acted upon by others.64 Here, the “authorial” force of imperium is activated: the populus Romanus says not “facite” but “credite.” Belief in Rome’s divine paternity thus does not just respond to imperium but is produced by it.

This belief is confirmed dialogically. Enduring Rome’s imperium produces the conclusion that one would not be enduring it were the story of Mars’s paternity of, and attendant favor for, Rome not true—in that sense, the Mars story is a way for subjects of the imperium to represent to themselves their own subjection.65 What is envisioned is not that the peoples of the earth refrain from contradicting Rome’s narrative while nonetheless withholding credence: “without distress” (aequo animo) suggests that we are dealing rather with an internalization of that narrative, in that the minds of the peoples of the earth do not revolt at the idea.

The subjects of empire, however, do not produce the story, but rather the populus Romanus (the subject of the active consecrare, referre, and ferat). That Rome is in a position to produce and make valid the story then strengthens the story itself, since the story explains how Rome has come to that position in the first place. Imperium is thus inexhaustibly self-confirming: one listens to imperia, “orders,” because of the fact of imperium, “imperial command,” and treats as fact the imperium because it produces imperia that people listen to. Once inside this loop, there is no getting out, because, to do so, one would have to be where the imperium of the populus Romanus has no force, and, for

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64 On auctoritas see Heinze, Hellegouarc’h 1972, Kienast 72–73, Crook 117–23, and Galinsky 10–41. The concept of imperium has been widely discussed: cf. e.g. Wagenvoort, Combès 9–49, Versnel 313–55, Bleicken (esp. 287–94). Whatever the original character of imperium, it is in the historical period narrowly associated with military command. On the interrelationship between auctoritas and imperium in the person of Augustus, see Galinsky 377.

65 In that sense, the story of Mars’s paternity can be thought alongside the imperial cult in the East (see above all Price 1984). In this regard, SEG 16.486 (cited at Wiseman 1995: 161) is almost too good to be true. The inscription comes from Chios, dates to the late third or early second century B.C.E., and records the giving of games in honor of the Romans in return for their military assistance. I quote Wiseman’s translation of ll. 22–29: “. . . and wishing by all means to make clear the goodwill and gratitude of the people, and to present the citizens maintaining and together increasing what appertains to glory and honour, he [sc. the euergetes] produced at his own expense an offering to Rome worth one thousand Alexandrian drachmas, comprising the story of the birth of Romulus the founder of Rome and his brother Remus. According to that story it came about that they were begotten by Ares himself, which one might well consider to be a true story because of the bravery of the Romans.”
the gentes humanae, there is no such place, since, ideologically at least, Rome’s imperium extends everywhere and forever.66

There is, however, always at least one party to whom an imperator’s imperium does not extend: himself.67 The populus Romanus is in the preface depicted as a corporate imperator over its subjects: it issues orders to others, but, necessarily, not to itself.68 The sole avenue to belief in the Mars story that Livy identifies comes through an imperative to which Romans are by definition not subject, and to be subject to which is both a mark and a part of political subjection. In explaining his own admission of fabulous stories to his text, he offers a reason why the subjects of empire should and do believe in them, but no reason why Romans should.69 It should be observed as well that his explanation of the genesis of fabulous foundation stories notably avoids vouching for the legitimacy of that genesis: he says that “antiquity is typically given an exemption to make the origins of cities more august” without declaring that he, too, will be giving this exemption, and the protasis “if it is appropriate that any people be allowed to make sacred its own origins and to attribute them to the gods as auctores” leaves quite undecided the question whether it is in fact appropriate.

One might object that many Romans will have believed that Mars fathered Romulus and Remus, or at least will not have disbelieved it, and furthermore that it goes without saying that Romans should want to believe in their own divine ancestry, and that Livy naturally deals only with the category of be-

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67 Imperium implies an object distinct from its subject; thus, the self can exercise imperium over itself only when the self is imagined as composite, as Sal. Cat. 1.2: nostra omnis vis in animo et corpore sita est: animi imperio, corporis servitio magis utimur. . . . The notion that imperium does not govern the populus Romanus as a citizen body (as opposed to when it is under arms) is underscored by the expiration of a general’s imperium upon reentry within the pomerium (see the survey at Liou-Gille 1993).

68 Cf. Eder 87 on Augustus’s relationship to the populus Romanus: “[he] had fashioned out of a republic of oligarchs a republic for all Romans and had thereby put it within reach of all to feel themselves primarily as masters of the world.” Cf. the conclusions of Nicolet.

69 Livy creates senses in which the pre-foundation myths both are and are not within his history: not only do we get the introductory distinction between what is appropriate to fabulae and what to incorrupta rerum gestarum monumenta, but his title itself does not recognize that anything before the urbs condita is contained in the Ab Urbe Condita (on the title see Horsfall 105) and, when he comes at the beginning of Book Six to recapitulate the First Pentad, the first few pages of Book One are conspicuously absent: 6.1.1, quae ab condita urbe Roma ad captam eandem Romani . . . gessere . . . quinque libros exposui.
lievers that needs explanation, that is, non-Romans. On the first score, that is no doubt so, but to say that Romans believed is not to say that within his history Livy authorizes either that belief or belief in direct divine intervention in general. On the second, Livy gives strong reasons not to believe in Mars’s paternity. His declared policy about traditions better suited to fabulae than to history is often characterized as fence-sitting: “Traditions before or during the foundation of the city that are more suited to the stories of poets than to uncorrupted monuments of history I do not intend either to confirm or to refute,” (praef. 6). Rarely observed is that this strongly privileges skepticism: refusal to confirm is itself to take a skeptical position (otherwise, why not confirm?) while refusal to deny is not at all to take a position of belief.

Levene 26n126 allows that “the tone of the passage is certainly skeptical” but objects that “Livy is not discussing the supernatural here, but pre-foundation myths.” But Livy is discussing pre-foundation myths that are explicitly supernatural: he says that he will neither confirm nor refute the pre-foundation stories, then declares that antiquity receives its exemption to mix the human and the divine (i.e., to tell stories of supernatural involvement in human affairs), and then turns to the story of Mars’s paternity as his lone example (in the preface) of a pre-foundation story. In short, the only feature of the pre-foundation myths that appears relevant to Livy’s project here is their supernatural character. Kajanto 23 wishes Livy’s recusal to apply to the supernatural tout court; Levene is solicitous that it be limited to the pre-foundation period. I would argue that the skepticism is in effect for a negotiable time period after the moment of foundation. The haec et his similia at praef. 8 that Kajanto wishes to mean stories of the supernatural from before the foundation and stories of the supernatural in general does not have to mean that, but it is certainly not difficult so to read it, given that the only feature of the pre-foundation myths that has exercised Livy here is their supernatural element. The reappearance, in very similar language, of the topos at 5.21.8–9

70 Cf. Wiseman 2002: 362, “[t]he very fact that purists tried to insist on rational criteria entitles us to infer that the general attitude was different from theirs. Even in the sophisticated Rome of the first century B.C., for many readers the distinction between the proper pursuits of poets and historians was far from clear-cut, and certainly not a simple matter of literary genre.” On the story of Mars’s paternity of Rome under the Republic, see Classen 26–27 (with bibliography). Ancient testimonia on the foundation of Rome are collected and translated into English in Wiseman 1995: 160–68.

71 On the perils of treating people like Cicero and Varro as typical, and even of trying to talk about what they themselves “really” believed, see Feeney 1998: 14–21.

72 For Moles 149, the declaration makes Livy “part-Thucydidean” and “part-Herodotean.”
is surely suggestive that the problem does not disappear simply because the city has been founded. His recusal announces, then, a fairly strong position: that he would prefer that no one think that he believes and will write his history accordingly, but that he will not be aggressive or impolite about it. As I suggested above, if this skeptical position applies to any story in his history, it is that about Mars fathering Romulus: it is the lone example in the preface of a story better suited to fabulae than to history.

Another reason not to believe in Mars’s paternity is that Livy all but disallows it. As Levene 129 observes, neither of the geneses considered for Rhea Silvia’s story that Mars raped her is that Mars in fact raped her. Rather, Livy says that she told the story “either because that is what she thought or because a god was a more respectable figure to whom to attribute her wrongdoing” (1.4.2). A reader determined to believe that Mars fathered the twins could accommodate what Livy says, by choosing the first alternative and inferring that Rhea Silvia was correct in her belief. But conspicuously to exclude, even as one explanation among others, Mars’s involvement and instead offer the connotatively skeptical “because that’s what she thought” while it does not exclude Mars’s involvement, nonetheless makes that reading as contrary to the conventions of expression as possible. The reader is given the option of performing the work of perverse supplementation required to provide such a reading, but is at the same time alerted that the mode of thinking inclined to perform that work is not at home in this narrative. If one wishes to have one’s mode of reading approved by Livy, one needs to think skeptically, at least when it comes to the relationship between political power and the supernatural.

Far from implying, then, that, if there is reason for the gentes humanae to believe in Mars’s paternity, Romans are a fortiori justified in believing in it, Livy gives his Roman reader strong reasons for not crediting it. To read Livy’s history like a Roman is to make oneself unlike the gentes humanae caught in the loop of imperium; itself an imperator, the populus Romanus is free not to heed the imperatives it addresses to others. To be able to entertain skepticism is by this logic to be categorically different from the ruled; in a universe in which there are only ruled peoples and ruler-peoples, to be categorically different from the ruled is to be a ruler; and thus skepticism becomes a mark of radical distinction, an emblem of the unique autonomy and autarky conferred by

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74 Cf. Miles 141. In Fabius Pictor, Ilia (the name of the Vestal in his and other versions) was raped by a typically described divine manifestation of Mars who proclaims that she will bear twins; the birth of twins then confirms the divinity of the father: cf. Wiseman 1995: 2.
worldwide dominion. This distinction between Roman and other conferred
by distance from the story of Mars’s paternity, I would further observe, is
analogous to that between elite and mass conferred by skepticism about the
stories of Numa and Proculus Julius.

Spectacle and Skepticism. Here, it will help to engage Feldherr’s important
discussion of “truth-making” in Livy. As part of a larger argument about Livy’s
accessing the language of vision in order to create immediacy for the reader,
and indeed practically to engage the reader in the spectacles and rituals the
text represents, Feldherr argues that the phenomenon of reported fictions
of the supernatural is the result of two conflicting tendencies in Livy’s work.
The participatory ambitions of Livy’s history suggest that representations
put forward by leaders, and specifically holders of imperium, are themselves
what matter, regardless of whether the representations have their origins in
invention. Participation in the narrative would then appear to require ac-
ceptance of the fictions of Numa, or of Scipio, as fundamentally valid but
beyond categorization as true or false. Historiographical convention, how-
ever, demands acknowledgement of the difference between truth and fiction.
Feldherr 74–75 concludes that “[b]y showing that the social significance of
the magistrate’s claims is independent of traditional historical questions of
truth and falsehood, Livy moves the statements of a Scipio or a Numa beyond
the range of skeptical inquiry.” If anything, though, the point at issue in the
instances of Numa and Scipio seems to be that their statements are beyond
the range of belief: once Livy uses the word simulat, the story is not only
susceptible to skeptical treatment but has already been articulated in terms
that admit only skepticism.

We can make headway here by specifying more clearly the relationship
between the audience in the text on the one hand and Livy and his reader-
ship on the other.75 For the “ignorant and (in those times) uncivilized mul-
titude” for which Numa designs his fictions, the story works just as Feldherr
describes: Numa’s personal qualities and possession of imperium allow him
to make a story that counts as truth and then is proven valid by the success
of Romans who practice the religion Numa invented. Often, as Feldherr and,
earlier, Solodow have demonstrated, Livy’s readership is invited to share the
experience of observers within the text. In this instance, though, all urges to
participate are laid aside, and the experience of the reader is made different

75 Cf. Chaplin’s analysis (50–105) of the differing responses of internal and external
audiences to exempla, the distinction of Roller 2004: 5 between “primary” and “second-
ary” audiences for monumenta, and Leigh passim on the reluctance of Lucan and his ideal
reader to share in and enjoy the spectacles of civil war.
from that of Numa’s archaic multitude. The distancing inherent in the project of writing in the present about action in the past is here activated, to considerable effect: at that time and in that circumstance, the multitude believed; now, encountering the story across time and through text, we do not. What makes the difference between Livy’s usual striving for immediacy and these infrequent and localized distancings is, I would argue, the issue of social difference. In each of the cases in question, the stories are designed for and used on the lowly, and for Livy or the reader to accept them as anything beyond fictions would mean willingly and in the presence of an alternative to accept a socially degraded subject position.

Here the properties of a historiographical approach to the past perform a positive function in defense of the dignity of Livy and his readers: if the medium of writing in general imposes a separation that Livy’s language and compositional technique must overcome in order to approach an impression of immediacy, it can also at a moment’s notice be deployed as a barrier between past and present, allowing us to see, but not inducing us to experience, belief in supernatural fictions. Because Feldherr’s analysis so profitably insists on the spectacular, immediate, participatory character of Livy’s narrative, there is a danger that his argument will be taken to have reduced the conventions of historiography to a straitjacket that Livy can scarcely escape, once he has chosen to write history, and that only impedes the real project of the work, which is to make available to a contemporary audience participation in Rome’s past. But rejection of the supernatural was no generic requirement: Thucydides and Polybius, to be sure, would make it seem so, but, as Wiseman 2002 has shown, Livy’s reluctance to admit the supernatural was an oddity, and the skeptical mode was a distinctive and not at all inevitable choice. Writing has its disadvantages, but advantages as well: not really being in the archaic multitude, Livy has the option not to be overcome by Numa’s fiction but to master it, in the same sense that Numa can tell his story but not actually believe that he meets Egeria.

76 Cf. Feldherr’s discussion (155–63) of the punishment of Mettius Fufetius, where Livy, instead of narrating the execution, simply reports that all present averted their eyes from the awful spectacle: 162, “[t]he very statement that the onlookers turn their eyes away, as it breaks the contact between the spectator and the punishment, also releases Livy’s own audience from the necessity of ‘seeing’ the culmination of the execution.” Here, though, internal and external audiences join in avoiding participation; there is no split between internal participation and external abstention.

77 Cf. also the important remarks of Feeney 1991: 250–69.

78 It matters that Feldherr’s exemplary instance (55–63) of the synergy of human and divine causation is the battle of Aquilonia (10.38–41). The victory of the consul Papirius
That the central consideration in Livy’s skeptical stance is better understood as social distinction than as an intellectual commitment to rationalism can be seen in a few passages often used by those arguing for the sincerity of his religious convictions. Explaining why he includes lists of prodigies in his narrative, he writes (43.13.1–2):

I am not unaware that, through that same unconcern for the gods by which people now commonly (vulgo) think that the gods do not send portents, prodigies do not even get announced in public or recorded in annals. But as I write a history of times long past, my consciousness (animus)—I cannot explain it—becomes ancient, and some sort of feeling of restraint (religio) keeps me from holding unworthy to report in my own annals those signs that those most foresighted men judged should be acknowledged as such by the state.

Posited here is a “modern” frame of mind that Livy inhabits when not writing his history: by implication, this animus would sympathize with public and written neglect of portents. Contact with the past achieved in the writing of history is, however, a mind-altering experience, and his animus becomes like the animi of the past. That transformation allows him to feel religio as a reality and conditions how he writes. His report, however, is itself distanced: his animus is antiquus, but he does not merge so totally into the ancient outlook that he is unable to articulate that outlook as strange and different: after all, the declaration that his “consciousness becomes ancient” can only be made from a subject-position that is not ancient but modern and can thus recognize the ancient as “not properly belonging to the present.” And while, in the passages we have looked at, the ability to be skeptical about divine Cursor over the Samnites depends in part on dubious representations: not only does he contrive a dust-cloud to cause both Samnites and Romans to believe that another consular army is about to arrive and weight the odds heavily in Rome’s favor, but also, having been informed that a pullarius had falsely reported to him that the omens for battle had been favorable, he asserts that what truly matters is the report of the omens, not the omens themselves; claims that the responsibility for the lie should fall on the head of the pullarius; and arrays the pullarii before the front ranks, where the guilty one is brought down by a javelin, an event that is confirmed as an omen by the cawing of a crow. Here the reader’s separation from the spectacle is not vital, because the possibility of degradation is not at stake. The total engagement of both leader and led in the preparation for battle, and the clear articulation of the leader as a pole around which the power of the whole community is focused, establish that this event is not basically about high and low but about community and the person through whom the community’s power is expressed: 10.40.3, dux militum, miles ducis ardorem spectabat. We might also say that Tullus Hostilius represents the peril inherent in leaders believing too much in, rather than simply using, religion: cf. 1.31.5–8.
intervention is a mark of Livy’s, and the reader’s, distinction from the credulity of the masses, here it is conversely Livy’s willingness to include bizarre supernatural information that underscores his difference from the *unbelief* of the negligent majority of Romans (*vulgo*). One should be careful about using this passage to understand his relationship to the supernatural early in the *Ab Urbe Condita*: not only will the First Pentad have been in circulation long before the Fifth Decade, but it would have taken a dedicated, even obsessed, reader to set material from Book Forty-Three against material from Book One. But a related pattern of thought occurs in several passages in the First Decade in which he deplores contemporary neglect of the gods (3.20.5; cf. 8.11.1 and 10.40.10):

But this unconcern for the gods that now rules our age had not yet arrived, nor did every individual by imposing his own interpretation suit oaths and laws to himself, but rather shaped his character according to oaths and laws.

In each instance, neglect of the gods, not belief in the supernatural, becomes the characteristic of “most people these days” and Livy accordingly distinguishes himself from this majority, just as he distinguishes himself elsewhere by showing himself unpersuaded by (vulgarly acceptable) reports of the supernatural.

*Past and Present*

In this section, I present the case that these episodes of supernatural fiction strongly resemble each other, that Augustus’s discovery of the corselet shows distinct formal and thematic similarities to these episodes, and that Livy’s readership will have associated material from the narrative of the regal period with the figure of Augustus himself. It is important to make clear that I do not mean that Book One was written with an eye to the composition of 4.20.5–11, but rather that that passage exploits contemporary resonances already present in Book One.

The love-nest of Numa and Egeria, the report of the deification of Romulus, and the story of Mars’s paternity of Romulus have much in common. The first is expressly a fiction, and it is hard not to read the others as fictions as well. The alleged event in most instances takes place in a numinous setting: Numa “meets” Egeria in the grove he eventually dedicates to the Camenae (1.21.3); the *patres* “see” Romulus lifted on high in a thunderstorm, Jupiter’s

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79 On 43.13.1–2, see Levene 22–23 with bibliography, to which add now Feldherr 68 and Davies 46–51. For a useful collection of passages in which Livy expresses a preference for the *mores* of the past over those of the present, see Burck 1964b: 137n2.
favorite medium of communication with the people of Rome; Rhea Silvia, as an Alban Vestal, is presumably raped in the Temple of Vesta.\textsuperscript{80} Only Proculus Julius’ vision at first light lacks such a forum. Each event is witnessed by one person, or an exclusive group, and broader belief in it therefore rests on the auctoritas of that person or group. We are told flatly that Proculus Julius’s auctoritas had unlimited credit. The sentence that introduces the narrative of Numa’s installation on the throne begins “in those days the justice and sanctity of Numa Pompilus were famed” and he is a paragon of auctoritas slightly later when we learn that “everyone was molding himself after the ways of the king, as though he were their only example” (1.18.1). Rhea Silvia’s personal qualities are not underscored, but the imperium of the populus Romanus propagates the story of her rape. The fictions tend not to be self-interested but rather tailored to a social purpose: under Numa, Romans risk violent barbarism; upon the disappearance of Romulus, civil strife appears imminent; acknowledgement by the gentes humanae that Romulus was fathered by the god of war acts as part and parcel of their acknowledgement of the legitimacy of, and thus submission to, Rome’s empire. The object of each fiction is, I have suggested, marked as socially low: it is the multitudo and not the entire population, or the peoples of the empire and not the people of Rome, that consumes and believes the stories. The technique succeeds to a degree that itself strains credulity: Numa’s Romans are made so pious that other cities are unwilling to go to war with them, and the effects of Proculus Julius’s story are similarly astonishing (1.16.8, mirum quantum). Finally, Livy presents in each case strong reasons why a reader should be skeptically disposed to the reports: in order to believe, one needs to give a venia to the story.

Livy’s attitude toward these fictions seems broadly supportive.\textsuperscript{81} There is no trace of indignation, no sense of “the people’s right to know.” It may not be laudable in the case of the patres if they killed Romulus, but only because their

\textsuperscript{80} On the cloud as a “manifestation ouranienne de Jupiter,” see Liou-Gille 1998: 86. For Levene 133, Livy by neglecting the version in which Romulus disappears during an eclipse (see Levene 133n33) foregoes the opportunity to associate Romulus’s disappearance with a divine sign. One might say, though, that the sudden appearance of a low-flying, localized thundercloud in the Campus Martius, thick enough to be impenetrable to vision, is uncommon enough to hint at supernatural involvement. Here it might be argued that Livy has used one vaguely supernatural but less interesting (because merely meteorological) phenomenon without challenge so that it can serve as the forum for the skeptically treated disappearance of Romulus, which is much more interesting in that it showcases the intersection between authority and the supernatural. Temple of Vesta: at Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 1.77.1, Rhea is raped on the way to a “grove sacred to Ares.”

\textsuperscript{81} Levene 136 sees “no indication that this political use of religion is to be deprecated;” cf. Feldherr 66–67.
fiction was self-serving; with Numa and with Proculus Julius, it is exactly the public good that their deceptions aim to serve, and better a deceived, thriving community than a community that disintegrates for want of enabling fictions. And the question of the ethics of the story of Mars’s paternity is all the less pressing: the justice of Roman imperium is for Livy, as for everyone else, self-evident, and it is the nature of just imperium to issue imperia provided they are not vicious.82

By now, the senses in which Livy’s account of Augustus’s discovery resembles these episodes are probably evident, but for the sake of clarity it will be worthwhile to array them. Augustus’s story is framed as sitting ill with settled historiographical procedure and requiring a religious frame of mind in order to be believed. Motive and opportunity for fabrication are not asserted, but strongly suggested. The discovery takes place in a sacred space, and Augustus is sole witness to the corselet. His authoritative testimony, couched in language of the sacred, is the sole avenue through which the story merits consideration. As I will argue below, the passage’s references to Augustus’s program of religious restoration and that program’s associations with the end of civil war also suggest that his story is tailored to a social purpose: preventing Crassus from dedicating spolia opima secures the general preeminence of Augustus that brought to an end, and continues to keep at bay, civil war. Missing from this catalogue of correspondences is any characterization of the audience for Augustus’s story as socially low, but I argue in the final section of this paper that it is precisely the reader’s experience of these earlier episodes and recognition of the other kinds of resemblance between them and Augustus’s story that allow the reader to interpret that story, too, as fraught with implications for Livy’s, and the reader’s own, social identity.

The connection between 4.20.5–11 and fictions earlier in the narrative is strengthened by the ways in which Livy’s account of the regal period, especially his treatment of Romulus and Numa, calls to mind Augustus himself and Roman society of Livy’s present. Many readers have detected links, but there remains a consistent tendency in one strand of scholarship to play down associations between Livy’s early Rome and his present.83 Walsh 1961b insisted that, since Livy is not exclusively adulatory of Romulus and Camillus (the two figures most often cited as “Augustan”), he cannot have meant them to evoke

82 For the concept of the bellum iustum, see Weinstock 243–44; on the idea of the empire’s benevolence, see Kuttner 86–123. On the indisputable superiority of Romans in Livy, see Walsh 1961b: 64–65.

Augustus, since, had he done so, he might have been taken to be criticizing him.\footnote{Camillus and Augustus: cf. eg. Burck 1964a: 41–42, Hellegouarc’h 1970, Stevenson, Mineo.} It is in the first place unsafe to assume that only adulatory allusion is possible; but second, and more importantly, allusion to Augustus need not mean that Romulus and Camillus are to be thought of as exactly like him, but rather only that they in some sense resemble him and raise issues like those he presents.\footnote{Cf. e.g. Burck 1964a.} That is, it is one thing to say that Livy’s Romulus is “about” Augustus and another to say that the kings of Book One, and later figures like Camillus, explore a timely issue: how does Roman society look when one person alone is of defining importance to the state and the culture? From that point of view, it is likely that a reader of Book One will have felt invited to think about Augustus while reading the narratives about Romulus and Numa (a question quite apart from whether Livy meant these figures to refer to, reflect on, or comment on the \textit{princeps}).\footnote{Cf. esp. Kennedy 43. A case for intentionality has been made by e.g. Santoro L’hoir. Henderson 1998 presses the case that the meaning of Livy’s text will have evolved as the Augustan regime developed.} Since it is important to establish that a reader will have been able to associate the report of Augustus’s research with fabrications early in his text, let us look first at what Livy’s preface says about possible modes of reading his text, and then review some links between Romulus, Numa, and Augustus.

The preface encourages a mode of reading that juxtaposes deep past and immediate present. In the first place, Livy anticipates that most readers will be bored by the earliest material and eager to move on to recent history (\textit{praef. 4}):\footnote{For the complicated negotiations in the preface between Livy’s and the readership’s interests, see Moles. It matters, however, \textit{pace} Moles, that Livy leaves outside “the majority of readers” a select group of readers who \textit{will} derive pleasure from the ancient material: this is a typical rhetorical production of approved and disapproved readerships aimed to persuade all readers not to read like this clueless majority of the imagined readership but rather like the discerning minority.}

I have no doubt but that the majority of readers will find that the narrative of the first origins and the period nearest the first origins offers them less pleasure as they hasten on to these recent events through which the powers of the foremost people of the world have for some time now been wearing themselves out.

On the one hand, the statement acknowledges basic difference between then and now; on the other, it characterizes the readership as looking urgently for
material about the present and so perhaps in its absence (at least till Livy gets around to writing it) inclined to satisfy itself by looking for the present in the past. Second, he endorses an approach to the text that looks above all for features of the past that are applicable to the present. Declaring of little importance questions that seem to underscore the difference between present and past—that is, the supernatural elements attached to the pre-foundation stories—Livy directs the reader to turn his attention rather to what people had been like and how they had acted, and then proposes that the special benefit of reading history is that it allows one to use the past to mold oneself and one’s community. He has declared, to be sure, that, while he treats the early material, his own field of vision will exclude contemporary events (praef. 5). This move, however, does not forbid a reader to see the present in the past, but rather guarantees that the narrative in which a reader sees the present was not constructed because of the present: resemblances between past and present are thus real, not the result of artifice or partisanship, because the historian has taken his eyes off of the present as he begins to write. The preface’s arguments are not irresistible, nor is a reader compelled to look for the present in the past; they do, however, dispose a reader to look for ways general or specific in which to link past and present.

It also matters that Livy articulates the character and contributions of individual kings in terms of their resemblances to each other, above all to Romulus and Numa. Numa in particular is aware of his own exemplary

88 Cf. Fox 111: “By showing . . . late republican themes at work in a regal context, [Livy] gives the regal period a particular role within his history, as a microcosmic prelude, where . . . unpleasant aspects of Rome’s development can be introduced, but where they are treated allusively: thus, while a sense of historical depth is created, at the same time they are not explored in sufficient detail to enable an anachronistic picture to emerge.” One might add that the relatively schematic configuration of regal politics makes the period more easily thought alongside other periods: avoidance of detail specific to an archaic context prevents the separative effect such detail might have. For language early in Book One that emphasizes difference between present and past see Burck 1964b: 136–37.

89 Praef. 8–10. On the rhetorical maneuvering here as a compromise between the initially divergent interests of Livy and his readers, see Moles 150.

90 Providing the impression of impartiality by insisting that one is writing not for contemporary reception but for posterity had been a standard part of the rhetoric of historiography since Thucydides (1.22.4) characterized his history as a “possession for all time” not “a performance-piece to be listened to in the present.”

91 Mazza argues persuasively that the preface and the narratio are intimately related.

92 On Romulus and Numa as a “diptych” cf. Dumezil 198–99 (discussing them as mythical figures, but relying heavily on Livy) and Burck 1964a: 43, “Wir dürfen . . . sagen, daß [Livius] mit der scharfen Sonderung des Romulus und Numa Pompilus
status and of that of Romulus: without implying that later kings will model themselves after one or the other, he thinks of future kings as describable within a Romulus/Numa dichotomy (“he thought that in a warlike community there would be more kings like Romulus than kings like Numa,” [1.20.2]). His successor Tullus Hostilius at first emulates Romulus’s glory but shows himself “not only unlike his predecessor but fiercer than Romulus” (1.22.2); later, again in emulation, he becomes an exaggeration of Numa. Hyper-Romulus that he is, though a plague is ravaging the population, he will allow no rest from campaigning and so catches a long illness. The disease breaks his spirit and, though previously he had thought religious practice the least kingly thing imaginable (1.31.6), he now became obsessed with religious scruple and passed the habit on to his people. The populace, recalling Numa’s reign, thought relief could be found in seeking the pax deorum (1.31.7). Livy then reports (1.31.8) that there is a story that Tullus consulted Numa’s commentaries, discovered secret rites to Jupiter Elicius (whose cult Numa had established [1.20.7]), and set to work on those rites in private; he did not, however, perform them correctly, was not visited by a divine apparition, and was instead destroyed by a lightning bolt sent by an enraged Jupiter. Tullus thus explores, and defines by transgressing, the unacceptable space beyond the poles occupied by Romulus and Numa. Ancus Marcius by contrast occupies the center between these poles: he “had a nature that was in-between, mindful both of Numa and of Romulus.”

Three distinct factors make these kings as they are, that is, like or unlike Romulus or Numa: innate character (ingenium), deliberate use of Romulus

zwei grundverschiedene Herrschertypen, den Kriegerkönig und den Priester-König, herausprüparieren wollte und daß er in der Gestalt der folgenden Herrscher diese beiden Modellvorstellungen variiert und verschieden ponderiert” (“Livy meant, with the sharp distinction between Romulus and Numa Pompilus, to create two fundamentally different types of ruler, the warrior-king and the priest-king, and, in the figures of the subsequent rulers, he makes variations on, and weights differently, both of these conceptual models”). See also Haffter 243 and Fox 113. For the way in which Livy’s text operates as its own intertext, see Kraus 1998.

93 On Romulus and Tullus, see Penella and Meurant.

94 Or, just maybe, “a disease caught far away,” longinquo morbo [1.31.5], which would link the disease to his insistence on campaigning.

95 1.32.4. Cf. Levene 140, “Livy wants to be able to show how [Tullus] represents a perversion of the values of Romulus and Numa, in order to contrast him with his successor Ancus, who represents a desirable combination of those same values.” The measure symbolizing the fusion of Romulus and Numa in Ancus is the creation of the fetiales, an introduction of Numan religious practice to the Romulean pursuit of war. Other writers assign the establishment of the procedure to other kings: cf. Ogilvie 1965 ad 1.32.5.
or Numa as exempla, or the particular demands of being king of Rome. That the kings are best described not simply on their own terms but in terms of their degree of resemblance to the first two kings is thus overdetermined. The bearing of this fact, however, on whether post-regal leaders remain subject to the Romulus/Numa model hinges on a couple of difficulties. First, the constitutional change effected upon the expulsion of the Tarquins, and the Roman revulsion from the name of “king,” might mean that Republican leadership has to be understood within an entirely different model from that used to represent the kings. That is, the Romulus/Numa dichotomy might not be of much use to understand Roman leadership as a broader category covering kings, consuls, and dictators, but only the peculiar phenomenon of Roman kingship. This is a serious argument, in that the defining political characteristic of the Republic (at least as it is discussed in the historical period) is the absence of kings, and in that Livy largely supports this definition, rarely representing the figures of early- and middle-Republican figures as “like” the kings (Camillus is a signal exception). At the beginning of Book Two, however, as Livy lifts the curtain on the new, post-monarchical state, he almost immediately minimizes the differences in leadership between monarchy and Republic. He depicts the consulship as departing from the kingship not in power but only in the new concept of annuity; and, what is more, he treats as negligible the other distinguishing feature of the consulship, that is, collegiality—indeed, he views that principle not as a salutary check against the whim of either consul, but as a potential duplication of the fearsomeness of the royal power (2.1.7–8). Furthermore (and this problem affects not only this point but the whole question of the relationship of Livy’s work to his culture, and, indeed, the question of the nature of Augustus’s principate) we have no sure signs what kind of political context Livy’s history imagines itself inhabiting: is Roman society now largely as it was under the Republic, and do the heroes of the Republic provide the real precedents for Augustus and his role in Roman society, or is it rather now substantially different, to a degree that we must think back beyond the Republic for the most relevant comparanda? In this regard, it is telling that, during the Republican narrative, it is above all at points of crisis, when Rome threatens no longer to be Rome

96 For the unappealing cast of the terms “rex” and “regnum” in Livy see Bruno 1966a: 238–40.
97 On Camillus’s links in Livy to Romulus and Numa, see Burck 1964a: 43–44.
98 Cf. the apposite remarks at Henderson 1998: 317–18. Chris Kraus helpfully suggests to me by way of comparison the opening of Tacitus’s Annales, where the Republic forms a kind of interlude between Rome’s original reges and its post-Actium principes.
and the Republic no longer the Republic that the kings come most insistently to mind. Camillus, who prevents Romans from losing the Romanness that the site of Rome confers, becomes “Romulus”; likewise, Appius Claudius and the Decemvirate, by threatening the aristocratic autonomy that the Revolution had established, become most easily thought as a repetition of the threat posed by the last Tarquin.

Aiding the association of the figure of Augustus with the narrative of the regal period are some respects in which Romulus and Numa, among others, evince characteristics and evoke themes that should have caused even a casual reader to think of Augustus. We need not view these as the result of a one-sided process of Livy making his kings “Augustan”; we have also to reckon with Augustus’s own representation of himself as “Romulean” or “Numan.” Thus Livy’s text and Augustus’s own activity converge to associate past and present. Miles 88–109 has argued for a cycle of foundation and re-foundation in the First Pentad that links Romulus and the “second founder” Camillus with Augustus. The foundation/re-foundation of Rome had come about through strife that ended in elimination of a sole competitor for the throne: strife between brothers, the commonest Roman metaphor for civil war, in the case of Romulus and Remus; civil war in the case of Augustus. Octavian, it was well known, had been offered the name “Romulus” before settling on “Augustus.” Romulus had built Rome’s first temple, the Temple of Jupiter Feretrius; Augustus was its new conditor. Romulus had cultivated the divinity of Hercules, his predecessor in deification, with the evident aim of securing his own divinity; Octavian divi filius had cultivated the divinity of his adoptive father Julius Caesar.

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99 Cf. Liebeschuetz 61.

100 5.49.7, Romulus ac parens patriae conditorque alter urbis. Cf. 7.1.10, also of Camillus: dignusque habitus quem secundum a Romulo conditorem urbis Romanae ferrent.

101 Cf. Luc. 1.1, but esp. Hor. Epod. 7.17–20 linking the strife of Romulus and Remus with the recent civil wars. On fraternity, civil war, and Romulus and Remus see Bannon 149–73. Haehling 54–56 doubts whether the story could be read with reference to the recent past.


103 Hercules: 1.7.15. On the deification of Julius Caesar see Weinstock 364–410. Livy had made a choice: other versions of the origin of the Temple of Janus placed it under Romulus (cf. LTUR s.v. Ianus Geminus, aedes; Ogilvie 1965 ad 19); assigning it to Numa more clearly distinguished the martial Romulus and the pacific Numa (cf. Galinsky 318–21). In general on Livy’s displacement of religious foundations from Romulus to Numa, see Levene 131.
to Octavian, too, as he took the auspices on 19 August 43. Romulus was said to have been conceived by the deus praesens Mars; Octavian’s mother was supposed to have been impregnated by a similar divine apparition, in the form of a snake.

The links with Numa are also strong. Livy credits him with the invention of Roman religion; Augustus advanced the impression that he had restored both its structures and its rituals. After a period of constant war, Numa had to convert a society that knew only war into one that knew only peace, as did Augustus. Numa became the lone exemplar after whom Romans formed their mores; Augustus was concerned to project this image of himself in his Res Gestae (8.5), and the tendency antedates considerably that document. The first act of Numa’s reign was to build the Temple of Janus, while Livy points out, during the report of Numa’s construction (1.19.3), that Augustus was one of only two people who had closed its doors since Numa’s reign. Galinsky (84, 346) has argued that Augustus presented himself as both Romulus and Numa, and there is a strong sense in which Romulus might be read as prefiguring Octavian and Numa as prefiguring Augustus. These associations need not mean that within Livy’s text Romulus and Numa are only really “about” Augustus—at the least, Romulus would then also have to be “about” the deified Julius Caesar—but that, among other things, their narratives demand to be thought alongside Augustus and as bearing on the history of the princeps and his place within Roman society and the trajectory of Roman history. Indeed, while Numa’s sacred fabrication provides precedent for Augustus’s potential sacred fabrication, Romulus himself is not strikingly associated with a sacred fiction—that role belongs rather to Proculus Julius, whose part in securing

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105 Suet. Aug. 94.4 (the god here is supposed to have been Apollo). Alexander (Plut. Alex. 2.3–4) and Scipio (Liv. 26.19.6–7) had similar stories attached to them, so that the story about Augustus does not in fact evoke Romulus alone.

106 Cf. Ogilvie 1965: 90, “Even without the allusion in [1.]19.3 such a treatment [sc. emphasizing Numa’s cultivation of peace] would be bound to strike a contemporary note for L.’s readers: peace and the example of the princeps. Did not Augustus reappoint a Flamen Dialis after the lapse of seventy-five years and reform the Vestal Virgins?” On Ovid’s Numa in the *Fasti* as a precursor of Augustus, see Littlewood.


belief in Romulus’s deification looks rather like Octavian’s cultivation of a comet that appeared during Caesar’s funeral games as evidence that Caesar had become a god.109

Our reference at 4.20.5–11 to Augustus’s research does not, then, occur in a vacuum. Rather, by Livy’s programmatic, by the sense of pattern in the characterization of individual kings, and by specific resonances between the activities of the kings and of Augustus, a reader has been prepared to associate stories about Augustus with stories from Book One.

II. THE AUTHORITIES OF LIVY AND AUGUSTUS

In this second section, I explore the implications of linking Augustus’s story about Cossus with the religious fictions early in the work. If we think of the beneficial effects of these fictions, then an interpretation of Livy’s treatment of Augustus’s story seems ready to hand. Augustus’s fiction would, in this interpretation, serve the good of the Roman community, which has been alarmingly close to breaking apart. He had contrived to suppress the glory of a potential competitor, but our passage shows how the recently achieved absence of competitors could be generally beneficial. First of all, Livy calls to mind Augustus’s religious restoration (4.20.7). The collapsed roof of Jupiter Feretrius both figures and forms part of the moral decrepitude that both caused and was punished by the civil war: indeed, we might call the ruin a concrete instance of the metaphor of collapse Livy uses (praef. 9) to describe the historical movement of the edifice of Roman mores. Augustus’s restoration of Jupiter Feretrius and other temples then figures and forms part of the restoration of mores and religious practice, which are in Augustan discourse the inseparable companions of civil war’s end, an end ultimately effected only by the elimination of competitors to Augustus.110 And the only prior appearance (1.19.3) of Augustus’s name refers to that much-touted closing of Janus and thematizes not only his making the difference between war and peace but also the centrality of religious restoration to that difference.111 If the prospect of a new Cossus seems to threaten the position of Augustus, it also threatens the peace he guarantees. If anything, then, (this argument would

109 One might point to Romulus’s pronouncement of Jupiter’s orders (1.12.3–7) but that event is not so obviously central to his reign as Numa’s fiction is to his own. The sidus Iulium: Verg. Ecl. 9.47–49, Pliny Nat. 2.93–94, Suet. Jul. 88, Dio Cass. 45.7.1, Serv. ad Ecl. 9.46.

110 So, for Haebling 181, the reference to Augustus’s reconstruction of temples should cause us to think also of the restoration of the state after civil war. Cf. Hor. Carm. 3.6.1–8.

111 Cf. LTUR s.v. Ianus Geminus.
go) Livy and his readers must be grateful for the fabrication, if fabrication is the price to be paid for a society in which temples may be rebuilt and the doors of Janus closed.\footnote{Cf. Moles 159, who sees 1.19.3 quod nostrae aetati di dederunt ut videremus and ab imperatore Caesare Augusto pace terra marique parta as referring back to praef. 5 malorum quae nostra tot per annos vidit aetas and praef. 9 domi militiaeque et partum et auctum imperium sit, and interprets the reference as suggesting that “Augustus is in part the answer to [Livy’s and his readers’] prayers.”}

That is how this argument ends if we follow traditional thinking about Livy. The story of his close relationship with Augustus forbids us to think that he is too far out of step with his friend.\footnote{For a review of the information and scholarship about Livy’s personal relationship to Augustus, see Badian 1993. On Livy’s position on the regime, the bibliography is immense. A selection: Walsh 1961a, Mazza 1966: 165–206, Woodman 1988: 128–40, Badian 1993, Kraus 1994a: 6–9 (with bibliography), Henderson 1998: 301–319.} The shared interest of historian and princeps in edifying historical exempla, too, suggests that they were, if not close friends, at least culturally sympathetic. Livy is also a social non-entity: if a senator was ill-advised to stand up to Augustus, it is unthinkable that Livy should do so.\footnote{On Livy’s biography, see Ogilvie 1965: 1–5 (bibliography on 5), Kraus 1994a: 1–9.} And, most importantly, we feel we know him: he is genial and self-effacing, but easily confused, and hopelessly dim-witted.\footnote{Cf. Walsh 1958. Forsythe 64 sees in 4.20.5–11 “no subtle irony or criticism,” pronounces that “its somewhat confused ambiguity results from Livy’s own shortcomings as a historian of early Rome, abundantly demonstrated by other passages throughout the first decade,” and chalks the whole mess up to “[Livy’s] intellectual inability to find solutions to complex historical and historiographical problems.” Cf. Walsh 1961b: 15, Burck 1992: 167.} If he cannot figure out (33.8.13) that katakalousi tas sarisas at Plb. 18.24.9 means “having lowered their spears” not “having laid their spears down,” and cannot even try to date the fall of Saguntum to a single year (21.15.3–6), could he possibly take on Augustus’s arcana imperii?\footnote{On katakallein, cf. Walsh 1961b: 143, Luce 1977: 39–40. On Saguntum, cf. Walsh 1961b: 145, Luce 1977: 141–42.}

If we do not assume that he cannot, it looks as though he does. For in order really to be in step with Augustus, one does not do what Livy does, but what Proculus Julius does: one spends all one’s auctoritas to bolster belief in what otherwise might seem incredible. Though Augustus’s discovery is represented like other deployments of the supernatural, it differs, crucially, in time and in perspective. Distance allows Livy, and us, to take a patronizing stance towards the audiences of the fictions. The pre-civilized multitude of archaic Rome was not yet fully, and the present subjects of Rome’s imperium cannot
be, Roman, and thus the judicious exercise of authority to create truths that will allow them to be ruled meets in Livy’s eyes and in ours with approbation. With Proculus Julius, Numa, and the populus Romanus qua worldwide imperator, we watch as authority crafts and then impresses truth on a third party. It does not, however, impress that truth on us. It is a vital characteristic of Livy’s treatment that for us, unlike for the archaic multitudo, the power of Numa’s or Proculus Julius’s auctoritas is not inexorable, just as in the present we as members of the populus Romanus can create, but need not ourselves be persuaded by, the stories that the subjects of our imperium find irresistible. This separation between the effect that Proculus Julius’s auctoritas has on the multitudo and that it has on us is neatly demonstrated by Livy’s calling him “an authority (such is the tradition) to be taken seriously about anything no matter how great” (1.16.5, gravis, ut traditur, quamvis magnae rei auctor). Here, Proculus Julius is both someone who could not nor be believed at the time and someone to whom Livy himself in the present will not in his own voice apply the term gravis auctor, precisely because to do so would signal his belief in the quamvis magna res. The effect is similar to that of the sentence that closes the report of the “deification”: “it is astonishing, the degree of credence that was given the man when he made his announcement” (1.16.8). The Roman multitude had accepted a wonder—that is, the deification—but for Livy and his readers the “wonder” (mirum) is not the deification but its acceptance as fact. This kind of separation fundamentally affects our response to the story. By Livy’s agency, we are made privy to the process of truth-making; we are aligned and associated with the makers; and we come to feel like prudent officers on the ship of state.

But when Livy shows that it requires a religious state of mind to accept Augustus’s testimony, the reader is not positioned smugly outside a fabrication but, rather, inside of one, and that is deeply objectionable. For the relationship between consumer and producer of fictions is, as we have seen, socially marked: the consumer is always the low and the lesser, the multitudo or the subject of empire. Augustus’s comparable attempt to cause Livy and his readers to believe in a fiction is potentially degrading: he treats them as though they were merely faceless members of the rabble, with all of the

117 Cf. Levene 136–37: “Livy regards the manipulation of religion to control the masses as only suitable when the city is in a state of infancy; later, it is implied, it will be less desirable.” He points (205) to Livy’s disapproval (6.1.10) of the pontifices’ restricting the common people’s access to sacral laws: quae autem ad sacra pertinente ad pontificibus maxime ut religione obstrictos haberent animos suppressa. Cf. the important argument of Krostenko that in Cicero’s De Divinatione the categories of skepticism and “fideism” are made to overlie the categories of nobility and ignobility, respectively.
unappealing characteristics of the rabble: it is not self-controlled but subject to the passions; it is unable to choose what is best for it but depends on its betters to guide it; it would not be civilized or Roman at all were it not for the careful shepherding of the responsible elite. Patronizing the mob is all very well until someone suggests that one is part of the mob; at that point, it becomes an overriding concern to prove this notion wrong by showing that the fiction does not apply to or persuade oneself. Livy’s sacralization of the consul version is, then, an act of social self-vindication: by showing that he sees through the story, he denies the abasement he would have suffered by crediting it. Far from being in the mob, he is most closely aligned with that element of society that produces truth. This situation is somewhat paradoxical. Demonstrating that he is one of the cognoscenti restores Livy to the position of safe superiority he has heretofore occupied in relationship to fictions about the supernatural, but in order to establish that he is one of the cognoscenti he must show himself conspicuously unpersuaded by the story, which entails presenting as preposterous the very story that the cognoscenti want people to consider persuasive.

The presence of the readership is central to this drama: it witnesses Livy’s assertion of his own position. But the readership is itself confronted with Augustus’s attempt to make truth and asked to make its own choice (existimatio communis, 4.20.8; versare in omnes opiniones licet, 4.20.11). Livy’s formal deference to Augustus’s auctoritas means that preference of Augustus’s story remains an option, however improbable. Maintenance of this option has an important effect. A reader who perceives a connection between Augustus’s discovery and episodes of truth-making earlier in the text is nonetheless conscious of having separated himself from those readers who will unquestioningly accept Augustus’s story. The position of superiority to the rabble that

118 The multitudo tends to be the same from community to community; the leadership gives it its Roman or Veientine or Faliscan character. Take for example the story of Timasitheus of Lipara. Liparian pirates have intercepted a ship of Romans bearing a gift to Delphi. But: 5.28.3–4, forte eo anno in summo magistratu erat Timasitheus quidam, Romanis vir similior quam suis; qui legatorum nomen donumque et deum cui mitteretur et doni causam veritus ipse multitudinem quoque, quae semper ferme regenti est similis, religionis iustae implevit. . .. He ensures the safe conduct of the gift to Delphi and returns the delegates to Rome. Any multitudo is here simply unmarked substance, molded into an identifiably “Roman” or “Liparian” form by the example of the leadership qualified to do so: put a “Roman” Liparian in office in Lipara, and the Liparians behave like Romans.

119 Even Ogilvie 1965, who does not believe that a corselet taken by Cossus could have survived intact to Augustus’s day, nowhere entertains the possibility that Augustus himself knowingly perpetrated a fraud.
Livy recovers before his readers is then available to his readers as well, who may move from indignation at Augustus’s insult to satisfaction that the fabrication was after all not for their own consumption, but for the part of the readership that is inclined to believe in *fabulae* and that, by that very inclination, stands self-condemned of needing to have those *fabulae* imposed on it. After all, if these people believe in the way that the rabble believes, they then have the rabble’s defining characteristic, thus they are the rabble. The incredibility of Augustus’s version then allows Livy’s readership a way to become “insiders” to the regime and to approve its fictions, so long as those fictions are felt to be for the consumption of others and not humiliating affronts to itself.

This opportunity to feel oneself an insider is not made generally available by the regime; it is, rather, Livy’s gift to his readers. If they are able to read between the lines, they are not just part of Augustus’s club; they are also part of Livy’s club. Rather more of Livy’s club, perhaps, since no effort on Augustus’s part put them in the know: Augustus in fact almost classed them with the *multitudo*. The idea of competition for the readership between Livy and Augustus that this formulation suggests is in fact ready to hand in the text: whatever one thinks of the subtext of the passage, Livy does not seem enthusiastic at the prospect of abandoning the story he has already written. His already-existing account and Augustus’s new one stand in obvious competition, a piece of Livy’s historiographical endeavor against a piece of Augustus’s. While Livy abandons all claims even to have *auctoritas* once Augustus’s enters the equation, he gives one everything necessary to hew to his own *auctoritas* and to doubt Augustus’s in this case.

The question of Livy’s *auctoritas* is more particular than the general challenge to his social worth presented by Augustus’s truth-making, but it is no less social. For it is the ambition of Livy’s history to be total and final. The tone of humility that characterizes his voice in the preface has, as it is supposed to do, produced the picture of a modest, even diffident writer. That tone is useful precisely because his endeavor is terribly ambitious: he means to treat all of Roman history.

The meek Livy of the prologue must not only contend with the ambition betrayed by the appearance of the first grouping of books but also anticipate the subsequent appearance of volume after volume.
of the *immensum opus*. The writing of history at Rome, furthermore, was a cutthroat business. Most modern historiography finds its justification in the proliferation of sub-disciplines and application of new interpretations and modes of inquiry. At Rome, by contrast, there was only one sequence of *res gestae*, “things that were done,” and it was the function of a work of history *ab urbe condita* to represent all of the *res gestae* worth consideration and to do so in a useful and pleasing way. Done right, such a history was definitive down to its end-date. Denigration of one’s predecessors is thus almost a generic requirement. If an era had already been narrated, the only reason to narrate it again was that it had been done incorrectly, that is, that it either did not contain all of the important “things that had been done”—and nothing else—or that it did not do those things justice. The evident point of writing a Roman history was then to supersede all other Roman histories;

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121 Cf. Moles 144, “the historiographical rat-race.”

122 See in particular Fornara 91–98. Cf. Wheeldon 50 on Lucian’s prescriptions at *Hist. Consocr.* 55–56: “[Lucian] sees no problem as to what constitutes the trivial and the significant.” On genres of history at Rome (recent history, history AUC, and world history) see Wiseman 1987: 246–48. The contents of a history were “the things worth remembering” (cf. *Cic. de Orat.* 2.63, *rebus magnis memoriaque dignis*; *Sal. Cat.* 4.2, *statui res gestas populi Romani caperim, ut quaeque memoria digna videbantur, perscribere*). The pronouncement of Sempronius Asellio might seem to expand the possibilities for history: *hist. fr.* 1, *nobis non modo satis esse video, quod factum esset, id pronuntiare, sed etiam, quo consilio quaque ratione gesta essent, demonstrare. (Cf. *Cic. de Orat.* 2.63, *rerum ratio . . . vult . . . et de consiliis significari quid scripтор probet et in rebus gestis declarari non solum quid actum aut dictum sit, sed etiam quo modo . . . and Plb. 3.31.11–13.) But just as there was only one sequence of “things that were done,” so there might be one and only one correct explanation of the *consilium* and *ratio* of the *res gestae* the thought justifies fuller explication, but does not envision multiple, competing accounts that offer differing *consilia* and *rationes*. This stands quite apart from what historians of Rome were actually doing: no one, I think, would deny that, say, Polybius, Livy, Dionysius, and Tacitus approached narrative historiography with significantly different ideological projects and interpretive programs, but the rhetoric of historiography was such that it did not admit that kind of consideration in justifying a new work, nor in its accounting of possible causes for bias did it make much room for the possibility of ideological, as opposed to personal, allegiance (cf. Woodman 1988: 73–75, Luce 1989). On pleasure as an aim of historiography, cf. Fornara 120–34, Woodman 1988 index s.v. “entertainment.”

123 On denigration of predecessors, see Marincola 113–17, 218–36.

124 See Marincola 17–57 on ancient historians’ representations of their relationship to their predecessors. Cf. Plb. 9.2.1–2, though he does not allow for the possibility that predecessors may have treated older material poorly. Doing justice: cf. *Sal. Cat.* 3.2, *facta dictis exaequanda sunt*; the importance of giving great deeds due praise is presupposed by Antonius in *Cic. de Orat.* 2.51–54 and 2.62–64.
likewise, since a proper account required no alteration or supplementation, it made superfluous any future accounts of the same subject.\textsuperscript{125}

Indeed, Livy frames his relationship to other authors as agonistic.\textsuperscript{126} He seems uneasy that his subject has been treated before: that is, everything else that has ever been written threatens to make his text otiose.\textsuperscript{127} And he imagines his own reputation cast into dark inconspicuousness amid a mob of writers, and his own name as even less conspicuous than that of the other members of the mob: their nobilitas and their magnitudo will block it from view.\textsuperscript{128} Both formulations envision Livy risking abasement.\textsuperscript{129} But they also set a scenario in

\textsuperscript{125} Cf. the characterization of Wiseman 1987 (247) of what in fact happened with Livy’s work: “The success of Livy in combining the tendentious narratives of Macer, Antias and Tubero (as well as the earlier and drier authors) into an ethically satisfying patriotic synthesis not only rendered his predecessors obsolete, but effectively put a stop to this sort of history [sc. history AUC] altogether. To try and better his classic statement would be like writing a new \textit{Aeneid}—just wasted labour.” Cf. Marincola 249: “[Livy’s] work is . . . the culmination of that tradition [of early Roman historiography] because he subsumes and replaces the very historians on whom he has based his own work.” Cf. Kraus 1998: 283 for the observation that Livy’s history consumes previous accounts in the same way in which the subject of his history, Rome’s empire, consumes place after place (cf. Kraus 1994b: 270 for Rome and the \textit{Ab Urbe Condita} as “growing physical object[s]”).

\textsuperscript{126} Cf. Moles 144: “The very project of writing a history of Rome from the beginning implicates Livy in a tradition where his work comes into comparison with all the other treatments, past, present, and future, of this hackneyed theme, and where it must justify itself to its potential readership . . . .” I would further say that there is no way for a work to justify itself as complementary or supplementary to other accounts; the only justification for a work that talks about everything is that it displaces every other work. Moles 143 dismisses the idea that the \textit{dum}-clause at \textit{praef.} 2 could mean that “Livy’s difficulties are compounded by the continuing competition from \textit{novi scriptores} in any historiographical field” thus: “\textit{rebus} echoes \textit{rem} and \textit{res}, \textit{vetustatem} echoes \textit{vetere}m. The \textit{novi scriptores} are engaged with the same \textit{res} as Livy himself, i.e. AUC history.” But since AUC history contained everything Roman, any Roman historian was a competitor. Cizek 362 perceives in Livy’s attitude towards his elite competitors the signs of a “Judas complex.” On Livy’s \textit{aemulatio} with Sallust, see Woodman 1988: 131, 136 and Moles 159–62 (cf. also, from a different perspective, Cizek); with Ennius, cf. Moles 154–55.

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Praef.} 1–2, \textit{Facturusne operae pretium sin si a primordio urbis res populi Romani perscrípserim nec satis scio nec, si sciam, dicere ausim, quippe qui cum veterem tum volgatam esse rem videam, dum novi semper scriptores aut in rebus certius aliquid allaturos se aut scribendi arte rudem vetustatem superatos credunt. \textsuperscript{128} \textit{Praef.} 3, \textit{si in tanta scriptorum turba mea fama in obscuró sit, nobilitate ac magnitudine eorum me qui nomini officient meo consoler.} \textsuperscript{129} Cf. Moles 145, “instead of achieving immortality through his immortal work Livy runs the risk of achieving complete annihilation through failure.”
which one can only overshadow or be overshadowed and in which Livy alone is set off against everyone else (an effect achieved by the peculiar image of him as the least distinguishable member of an already indistinguishable crowd). Once the rules of the game are set as winner-take-all, and the teams defined as, on the one side, Livy and, on the other, all other historians, it is easy to see how things will go if he does manage to garner fame and a name for the *Ab Urbe Condita*: he will then block the *nomina* of others, and they will stand outside the spotlight, consoling themselves for their obscurity. *Nobilitas* and *magnitudo* would in that event still describe the social prestige of Livy’s elite competitors but also now Livy’s literary prestige after he has reduced them to anonymity. That he proceeds to write his text, rather than abandon the project in the face of inevitable defeat, suggests that he believes that he may indeed make a name for himself, and block from view the names of others. His reference to his competitors’ social prominence, furthermore, does not merely argue for a potential effect of social on literary prestige: it also, by establishing commerce between the two, signals the possible convertibility

130 Cf. Wheeldon 58, “*turba*, as a description of these writers, seems to imply most readily a lack of individual distinction, rather than an abundance of talent.” Cf. also Moles 145, “[t]here is . . . an agreeable tension in the mere idea of *nobiles* and *magni viri* comprising a *turba*.” The image is sharper than the evident intertext, Sal. *Hist.* 1 fr. 3 Maurenbrecher, *nos in tanta doctissorum hominum copia*. Livy uses the more vivid “throng” and makes the defining characteristic of the other authors not erudition but glamour. There is perhaps further reference to the “crowd” of other writers in *praef.* 2, *quippe qui cum veterem tum volgatam esse rem videam*: *rem volgatam* could mean both “subject-matter that everyone already knows” and “subject-matter that has already been treated by a mob.” Wheeldon 56 notes the proliferation of the first person at the beginning of the preface.

131 Wiseman 1987: 252 sees in Livy’s articulation of his own work “the traditional phraseology of the Roman Republic being applied in a way unthinkable only a generation earlier.”

132 The boldness that continuing the work implies is then mitigated by the succeeding sentences in which he shrugs his shoulders (*utcumque erit*) at the dynamic of competition he has just articulated and turns to the strictly personal satisfaction he will derive from the undertaking: *iuvabit . . . et ipsum consuluisse* (*praef.* 3) and *a conspectu malorum* (*praef.* 5). Cf. Moles 148, “the public glory, the limelight, that Livy might win if his History proves a success means much less to him emotionally than this immersion in the past, temporary though it must be.” To say that one has written to please oneself softens the impression of ambition, but cannot erase it, for there is no reason to publish or circulate a text written purely for personal pleasure or therapy. To publish is to invite the evaluation of others, to submit an entry in the competition for glory.
of prestige within the limited field of literary production into prestige within the larger society.\textsuperscript{133}

If the ultimate prestige that can be derived from history \textit{ab urbe condita} lies in having the last word, that prestige is at risk if another author tries for the last word, and that is the threat Augustus’s research poses.\textsuperscript{134} The incomparability of the social consequence of Livy and Augustus may seem to prohibit the idea that Livy’s history could imagine itself in competition with the \textit{princeps}: a senatorial historian of prominent stock might conceivably produce such a history, but the undistinguished Paduan would know his betters.\textsuperscript{135} To the contrary, Livy’s middling status could make competition more urgent, for in his case his conspicuousness could only be due to literary production. The \textit{monumentum} of Livy’s history does not, after all, just commemorate the past; it commemorates him.\textsuperscript{136} The image of competitors blocking the view of his name evokes the idea that the monument of history displays not only the \textit{omnis exempli documenta} but also the name of the \textit{auctor}.\textsuperscript{137} Without the \textit{monumentum} that was sole record of his name, there was no question but that his \textit{nomen} would be obscured.

\textsuperscript{133} For Feldherr 30, Livy “rejects the traditional aristocratic motive of glory as the reward he expects for his labor” and attempts to divert the reader’s attention from the lowness of Livy’s own status to the monument of the \textit{AUC} itself, with the aim of insulating the text from the implications of the author’s origin and circumstances.

\textsuperscript{134} For the argument that Vergil, too, in \textit{Aen. 6} contends with and critiques Livy’s version of early Rome, see Woodman 1989.

\textsuperscript{135} So, for Miles, Livy’s social status is the central determining factor in how he writes 4.20.5–11. But could, say, Pollio have afforded to be less oblique?

\textsuperscript{136} For discussions of Livy’s history as \textit{monumentum}, see Moles; Miles 16–19, 55–62; Jaeger 1997: 15–29; Feldherr (see index s.v. \textit{monumenta}, Livy’s History portrayed as). The \textit{monumentum} imagined to commemorate Livy’s name: Feldherr 31.

\textsuperscript{137} Relevant is the famous anecdote retailed by Pliny \textit{Ep. 2.3.8}: \textit{numquamne legisti, Gaditanum quendam Titi Livi nomine gloriaque commotum ad visendum eum ab ultimo terrarum orbe venisse, statimque ut viderat abisse?} The story’s historicity does not matter so much as its evocation of the reception of Livy’s rhetoric. The \textit{nomen} that in the preface stands imperiled by the notability of other historians has here extended to the edges of the earth. The man from Cadiz, as if responding to Livy’s anxiety that he will be invisible, makes a pilgrimage that affirms that Livy is “visible” from every place in the world; indeed, Livy is here reduced purely to an object of the gaze, to the \textit{monumentum} that his history claims to be. The story might seem to hint that Livy has become a mere curiosity—after all, the pilgrim does not approach him—but the emphasis seems to me to lie on confirmation that Livy now is \textit{nobilis} and \textit{magnus}, that is, “worth a look” in a social sense. Note also that the history itself is elided from the story: it was not evidently the pleasure or edification derived from the book that occasioned the journey, but rather the symbolic value (\textit{nomen} and \textit{gloria}) produced by it (cf. Habinek 1998: 105). In this
Livy’s resistance to Augustus’s superseding his own activity makes sense in light of his lack of other avenues to renown. Wallace-Hadrill 1997 has described a fundamental shift that characterizes Augustan culture: into competition with the general competence of the Republican *paterfamilias* to pronounce consequentially on all fields of knowledge comes the specific competence of individual experts, often of no special social prominence, to speak authoritatively about individual fields of knowledge. As examples he selects the discursive fields of tradition, law, time, and language; his case study for tradition is the development of antiquarianism, but the amenability of Livy’s work to the model is evident. In most instances, Wallace-Hadrill is able to point to the absorption, literal or figurative, of experts into the household of Augustus, and argues that it is precisely the “lowly social status of the academic” that permits this absorption. Since, however, the very terms of expertise are that a “general” authority cannot master all fields, it is possible, and indeed natural, for an expert to correct a “general” authority like Augustus. It is only because an expert’s authority is limited to his discipline that such corrections are possible: only another “general” authority, a person of real social consequence, was any danger to the *auctoritas* of the anecdote, Livy has attained broader social prestige that only incidentally comes through the literary work but that is nonetheless framed in terms of the anxieties about broader social prestige highlighted in his preface. Cf. Wiseman 1987: 252 on this anecdote: “the sort of fame that only the greatest of *triumphatores* could have commanded before the Hellenized Romans of the late Republic had made literary talent something worthy of acclaim.”

Wallace-Hadrill 1997 sees “a fundamental relocation and redefinition of authority in Roman society” (7) and identifies in the historical development of fields of knowledge at Rome “a collapse of the authority of the Republican ruling class, a shift in the control of knowledge from social leaders to academic experts; and an appropriation of that authority by Augustus” (12). See also the revised version, Wallace-Hadrill 2005.

On Livy as academic, cf. Walsh 1961b: 20–21. It is unclear how many earlier historians had been non-senatorial: Valerius Antias and Claudius Quadrigarius are usually excluded from the *curia*, but this is unprovable (see Cornell 1986: 78–79).

Fornara 55 attributes the availability of the genre of history to someone of Livy’s status to Hellenization; it is perhaps better to assign it to a broader cultural development of which interactions with Greek culture were an important part.

Cf. also the tantalizing reference at Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.128 to Seneca’s use of researchers (*iis quibus inquirenda quaedam mandabat*) to find historical *exempla* for him. The practice fits well with Seneca’s claims to be a “general” authority: cf. Habinck 2000.
princeps. Wallace-Hadrill adduces in passing an anecdote that we can take further: according to Suetonius (Gram. 22.2), the grammarian Pomponius Porcellus reproved Tiberius for using a loan word; the jurist Ateius Capito protested that, even if the word had not been Latin, it would be now; Pomponius rejoined that Tiberius, though he had power to grant citizenship to persons, he did not to words. Taken for granted here is the ability of the princeps to pronounce things to be so or not so outside Pomponius’s field, while Pomponius guards the borders of that field with vigilance, and asserts sovereignty within them boldly. A retired boxer, Pomponius had good reason to protect the grammatical expertise that was his only mark of distinction. But the anecdote also suggests the ever-present possibility that broader auctoritas will percolate into fields of expertise: only the notably bold candor of Pomponius, set in relief by the ready obsequiousness of Capito, prevents Tiberius from acting the grammarian.

We might then see Livy’s resistance to Augustus’s research as an example of the jealous expert patrolling the frontiers of his domain, and reframe our understanding of the genesis of 4.20.5–11. The usual assumption among scholars who think that the passage was inserted into an existing text is that Livy had to include Augustus’s story. Augustus needed records to comport with his own story; he therefore made it known to Livy, or Livy simply became aware, that it was in his interest to register Augustus’s version as the correct one, and he wrote in response to Caesar qui cogere posset, though perhaps with sufficient ambiguity as to his personal opinion to allow himself a semblance of autonomy. This scenario is of course possible, but not necessarily preferable to the idea that Livy elected to include the passage; though neither can be established, the latter deserves to be aired as well, and has something

142 Here it is worthwhile to consider Suetonius’s report of Augustus’s attitude toward criticism of himself: Aug. 89.3 componi . . . aliquid de se nisi et serio et a praestantissimis offendebatur. Entering into a relationship of reciprocity with a social inferior is always a risky proposition; better not to dignify it with a response.

143 The story is related at Dio Cass. 57.17.1–3 as well. “Porcellus” for “Marcellus” is Kaster’s conjecture: see Kaster 1992: 99–102. Kraus (and Woodman 72n108) too adduces as an example the story of Pomponius Porcellus.

144 Kaster 1995 ad 22.3 justly cautions that Pomponius may not really have been a boxer; he will not, however, have been of high status, whether or not he had enjoyed a career in athletics.

145 For Syme 1959, the insertion was “forced upon him” (47) and “he probably regarded the whole business as a vexatious perturbation in a smooth and satisfactory narrative.” White 142–45 doubts that Livy was pressed but maintains (145) that “a prudent writer could not afford to close his eyes to what the reigning strongman said and did.”
to recommend it, in light of Livy’s history’s apparent ambitions to be final and unrivalled and of the obvious challenge to Livy’s authority presented by Augustus’s historiographical activities. Nor is it clear that Augustus would have exercised himself over the contents of Livy’s history. On this interpretation, Livy’s text would respond to a public assertion Augustus has already made and gotten accepted. By presenting and undercutting that version, Livy would be entering, belatedly, a public debate over Cossus’s precedent and over the historiographical activity of Augustus. The move does not merely cast doubt on Augustus’s story, but actually excludes his mode of inquiry from consideration, since it is quite unlike the set of procedures that Livy, as an expert in the composition of res gestae, validates through his practice.

Livy’s belaboring the difficulties of reconciling the consul version with his sources and his own narrative, and his enumeration of ways in which he has tried to no avail to do so, underscore that the new factor Augustus has introduced is simply not susceptible to ordinary historiographical treatment. Part of what makes the version unmanageable within Livy’s method is, I have suggested, that it is “revealed” history, the product of a supernaturally marked event rather than the result of collation of prior literary accounts. But allied to this objection may be a further one, that Augustus’s work on the Cossus question is not historiographical but antiquarian. Livy’s task is, after all, not simply to describe one event or one person, but to make everything important that had ever happened at Rome fit together in an intelligible sequence; to that end, he must reconcile unruly annalists, ensure that no one is military tribune in the same year in which he is consul, and in general hush the chaos of polyvocality—or, at least, restrict that polyvocality to judiciously deployed instances of confusion that demonstrate that uncertainty is the exception, not the rule. By contrast, because he limits his investigation to a particular object and event, and ignores the previous narrative accounts, the management of

146 Burck 1992: 164 doubts whether Augustus would have known Livy’s history at this point, but also thinks that Livy did not begin writing until 27, perhaps not even until 25.

147 Collation of prior accounts: cf. Marincola 105: “it is fair to say that the ‘methodology’ of non-contemporary history was to consult the tradition, what previous writers had handed down. We have no indications that a writer concentrating on the past was expected to re-inquire into earlier matters in any way other than reading his predecessors” and Fornara 56: “it must be admitted that history would not have acquired its name from any obvious emphasis placed on that activity [i.e. historia = “inquiry”] by Latin writers.”

148 On antiquarianism, see Rawson 1985: 233–49. If Livy knew Varro’s work, he seems to have made little use of it (cf. Ogilvie 1965: 6); he uses antiquarian material for flavor now and then, but apparently not for establishing fact (cf. Oakley 33–37).
which is the primary task of Livian historiography, Augustus does not have to trouble himself with the destructive consequences of his research: he can just upset through his antiquarian activities Livy’s delicately arranged narrative and leave without cleaning up the mess, exactly because, unlike Livy, when Augustus finishes telling the story of Cossus’s consulship, he does not then have to narrate what happened the next year, then the next, until he reaches the present. Livy’s review of the difficulty of making Augustus’s version fit within his own text retails all of the considerations that Augustus would have had to take account of, ought to have taken account of, had he meant really to undertake a serious representation of Rome’s past, really to wade out into the sea of history, not just get his feet wet. Read thus, the passage would be not the forced retraction of a muscled dissident but the decorous, yet indignant, exclamation of one whose expertise had been ignored, or had gone unconsulted, in the public sphere.

I am therefore sympathetic to the interpretation of Kraus (Kraus and Woodman 72) that

[p]art of what is going on here [sc. in 4.20.5–11] is Livy’s assertion of his own competence as a historian: Augustus may have been a ruler, but Livy was the scholar . . . . [I]t is . . . inescapable that in citing Augustus only to disagree with him (however generously) Livy is declaring his independence from the wider political authority that the princeps could potentially—and on rare occasions later, would actually—wield even in the sphere of literature.

But it is also a serious question whether a historian is ever “merely” an expert or “merely” a writer, especially when one writes as Livy does. For to have a mastery of Rome’s past is also to have mastery of the raw material of Roman moral discourse, that is, the exemplum, the contemplation of every variety of which Livy presents as the particular benefit of reading history (praef. 10). Augustus’s deployment, and production, of exempla was the centerpiece of the rehabilitation of Roman mores he presented his principate as effecting.

149 The image, from much later in Livy (31.1.1–5), is apposite all the same.


A much-cited passage of Suetonius (Aug. 89.2) characterizes Augustus’s reading habits in the following way:

In going through authors in either language he sought out nothing quite so much as precepts and examples that were salutary either for public or private purposes, and he often excerpted them verbatim and sent them to members of his household or to the officials in charge of the armies and provinces or to the magistrates of the city, according to the particular need of each for admonition.\textsuperscript{152}

Augustus’s interest in \textit{exempla} is, as Chaplin writes, not unexampled in literature contemporary with him.\textsuperscript{153} In the case of Augustus, however, the identification and circulation of \textit{exempla} is wholly imbedded within structures of command. It may seem quaint and patronizing to expect a refractory pro-consul to mend his ways upon perusal of a cautionary tale from the Samnite Wars or the like; I would suggest, though, that this image of Augustus makes more sense if we shift our focus from the choice of content of particular \textit{exempla} to deal with particular problems and view the policy of excerpting rather as establishing that all Augustus’s instructions, and the entire character of his leadership, are saturated with the discourse of virtue.\textsuperscript{154} Whether or not individual lessons “hit the mark,” interweaving \textit{exempla} into relationships of command converts those relationships into matters not of the bare giving of orders but of \textit{auctoritas}.\textsuperscript{155}

More than with most fields of knowledge, Augustus himself approached a claim to personal expertise in Roman history, since command of historical \textit{exempla} was as central to mastery of moral discourse as command of vocabulary is to mastery of a language.\textsuperscript{156} Much of Augustus’s most “historiographi-
cal” work (the tituli and elogia of the Forum Augustum, his own Res Gestae) postdates Livy’s early work; in fact, his investigation of the Temple of Jupiter Feretrius is, as far as I know, our first example of his inquiry into the distant past (he had long since been engaged in promoting a particular version of the recent past). But neither Livy nor Augustus invented the connection between auctoritas and exemplum; rather, by writing Roman history, Livy undertook an endeavor whose stock-in-trade was the exemplum, and Augustus by laying claim to moral authority was also professing competence with exempla.

Under those circumstances, tension between Livy’s project and the historical expertise of Augustus—not to say between Livy and Augustus—was probably inevitable. The completeness of a history in Livy’s conception lay partly in total coverage of exemplary material (praef. 10, omnis . . . exempli documenta). In other words, reading Livy is all the education a Roman needs. But Augustus’s auctoritas, too, was a generator of exempla, and, from the point of view of Livy’s history, a redundant one: a field supposed to be closed to competition was now being trod presumptuously by another authority—and one of considerable nobilitas and magnitudo. The question of Cossus’s office is not about exemplarity as usually imagined—i.e., virtus is not at stake—but it is exemplary all the same. It is a matter of determining under what circumstances the maiores used to perform a religious rite so that Romans today know whether they too should be performing it: the precedent of the maiores in ritual is by definition exemplary.

A draft of the Res Gestae may have been completed around 2 B.C.E. (Brunt and Moore 6, but see Ramage 1988), the same year the Temple of Mars Ultor was dedicated. Augustus did, at least by 13 B.C.E., have a document enumerating his achievements: Dio Cass. 54.25.5. On the Res Gestae see Brunt and Moore, Yavetz, Ramage 1987. Forum Augustum: Zanker 1968, Zanker 1988:192–215, Luce 1990, Evans 109–118, Flower 1996: 224–36, Galinsky 197–213 (bibliography before 1993 at 414n124), Spannagel, Gowing 138–45. For the intriguing claim that the Annales Maximi were probably a product of Augustus’s regime, see Frier 179–200.

Cf. esp. Stemmler.

See Kraus 1994a: 8 and Feldherr 35–37 on the comparability, and potential rivalry, of the projects of Livy and Augustus; on Augustus as Livy’s perfect ruler, see Woodman 1988: 136–40 (though approval of Augustus’s political agenda is entirely separable from aemulatio with his projects involving representation of the past).


For the centrality of ethical considerations to exempla, see Roller 2004.

Thus precedent as to under what conditions triumphs had been granted could be articulated as an exemplum: 31.20.3, res triumpho dignas esse senatus, sed exemplum a maioribus non accepisse ut qui neque dictator neque consul neque praetor res gessisset triumpharet. “[M]ilitary strategy and constitutional procedures are just as likely
have been room in the field of historiography if all Augustus’s exempla had aligned perfectly with (i.e., acknowledged as authoritative) Livy’s text, but in this instance Augustus’s work contradicts Livy’s and leads to the action opposite that which Livy’s work seems to recommend. That is, if one adduced as an exemplum Cossus’s dedication as military tribune, then there would have been a case for Crassus to dedicate as proconsul; as things turned out, the exemplum adduced and made decisive was Augustus’s.

But Augustus’s application of the exemplum might in another sense be seen as disrupting the exemplary process. Part of the value of any brilliant res gesta like Cossus’s, and the whole value of the community’s recognition of it, was its potential to inspire the emulation of later Romans who hoped by replicating or surpassing it to attain similar recognition and exemplary status. Failure, by contrast, appropriately to recognize an outstanding achievement was not merely unfair but represented a potential breakdown in the chain of exemplarity that was, at least from the point of view of Livy’s preface, a central contributor to the rectitude of the individual Roman and to the general health of the community.

Augustus’s work on the Cossus question then threatened to affect Livy as it had Crassus: both stood poised to receive recognition for a practically unmatchable achievement, and Augustus, by poking around in some ruins, had asserted that there was nothing they could do that his own auctoritas could not supersede. This parallelism is, however, purely a homology of effects in two different fields of distinction, produced by the same phenomenon of auctoritas; there is no “pro-Crassus” tendency in the passage. The implicit contest between the auctoritas of Augustus and that of Livy is not, after all, about anything so trivial as a particular piece of policy. It is rather about to whom Romans will turn for the last word on the past and for a presentation of the past that will cause them to live their lives in this way and not in that: will it be the historian, or the princeps? The outcomes to which the study of exempla leads do not matter here so much as who provides them, and in this instance the outcome matters only in that it proves that it was Augustus’s

to turn up in exemplary contexts as are the traditional heroes of early Rome,” Chaplin 3, cf. 137–67 (although she argues as well that Livy presents the import of exempla as mutable over time). For the essential connection between exempla and the mos maiorum, see Hölkeskamp. On the mos maiorum there has recently been a flurry of work: see Bettini, Blösel, and Pina Polo.

163 Cf. Luce 1990: 138 on the elogia in the Forum of Augustus: “the numerous and marked differences between Livy and the exiguous fragments show that those men whom Augustus assigned to gather and select the information treated Livy’s version of Roman history with calculated indifference. Augustus accepted their suggestions.”
exemplum, and not Livy’s, that made itself consequential. Nor is there an “anti-Augustan” tendency, at least as ordinarily understood. Resistance to Augustus’s story is not in the first instance about whether Romans should be under the leadership or domination of Augustus: it is above all, I would offer, about whether Livy’s history is to have sovereign authority and the full attention of the people of Rome, and it is only then and incidentally about Augustus, whose ability to threaten Livy’s auctoritas is plainly tied to his new and unique position within Roman society. This one passage does not make Livy’s text generally contrary to the Augustan regime; resistance here has appeared in response to a particular instance of Augustus’s work that seems to pose a threat to what Livy’s text is supposed to become. And surely much in Livy’s project was congenial to the regime: its emphasis, for example, on the importance of traditional religious practice and its apparent confirmation that sometimes the survival of the res publica had only been secured by the good offices of one great man. Least of all is Livy’s undermining of Augustus’s version animated by an abstract commitment to truth. Indeed, Livy himself is happy to alter what he found in his sources for edifying effect. More specifically at issue is the question who should be invested with the auctoritas to make truth: again, should it be the historian, or the princeps? So far as Livy is concerned, we know the answer: when read with care, the Cossus passage shows one whose auctoritas to prefer, and of whose to beware. And we might even say that Livy gets the last exemplum after all. When read with the insertion, the story of Cossus’s dedication and Aemilius’s triumph reads like an exemplum for how Augustus might have conducted himself in the Crassus affair. Cossus enjoyed his day as the apple of every Roman’s

164 On the inadequacy of the “pro-” and “anti-Augustan” model for understanding Augustan literature, see Feeney 1992 and Kennedy.
165 On 4.20.5–11 as a “dramatization of] the beginning of post-Augustan imperial history as the re-writing of the res publica” cf. Henderson 1998: 314–15; I like the formulation because it imagines the consequence of the Augustan regime as the production of new historiography. For a parallel argument, see now Kraus 2005.
166 On the “unus vir” theme in Livy, see Santoro L’hoir 230–41.
168 The Cossus event satisfies three of the criteria of Roller 2004 for an exemplum: it is consequential for the community (re bene gesta), has an evaluating audience, and is appositely commemorated (by the dedication). The fourth criterion, “imitation,” is not present, but if a reader is aware of what had happened with Crassus, he is conscious of a failed exemplum: Augustus’s testimony had interrupted the attempt of Crassus to imitate Cossus. And it is itself clearly an emulation of Romulus’s feat: so, the soldiers equate Cossus with Romulus, and he deposits the spoils next to Romulus’s.
Dirty Linen, Fabrication, and the Authorities of Livy and Augustus

eye and Aemilius’s triumph was overshadowed, to be sure. But Aemilius did not attempt to obstruct Cossus’s glory; rather, he dedicated a gold crown on Cossus’s behalf, and no civil strife came of it, nor did Cossus replace Aemilius as dictator. What a lot of trouble would have been spared, if only Augustus had had the good sense to consult Livy’s authority, and to heed his exemplum.

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