THE ANGER OF AENEAS*

The anger of Aeneas in the final scene of Vergil's epic has become the focal point of much of the recent criticism of the hero's behavior. *Furiis accensus et ira/terribilis* (12.946–47) he rejects Turnus' plea for mercy and dispatches him to the shades below. Over the past two decades, this unrelenting finale has provoked outright condemnation or, at any rate, a great deal of moralizing "in Stoic and even modern categories." With their emphasis on the presumed irrationality of Aeneas' conduct these interpretations of the final scene have provided the basis for some far-reaching "pessimistic" reassessments of the *Aeneid* in general.

The argument has not been distinguished by careful attention to either modern or ancient views of anger. While the latter, of course, will occupy us most, even a cursory look at modern theories of anger yields what one would suspect: anger is a complex and varied phenomenon which is susceptible to differing assessments and interpretations. Similar to Milton, who characterized anger as one of the two most rational faculties of man, several modern psychologists equate it with emotional maturity—as distinguished from hate and hostility, which are considered indicative of emotional immaturity—or, at any rate, regard it as a constructive phenomenon. Parallel to

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* This is a revised and slightly expanded version of the William Kelley Prentice Memorial Lecture at Princeton in October 1986. Earlier versions were presented at the Vergil Symposium at the University of Colorado and at the University of Pittsburgh.


2 In the preface to *Animadversions upon the Remonstrant's Defence against Smectymnus* (1641).

the ancient tradition, due attention is given both to the positive attributes of anger and to its negative aspects. There is the clear recognition everywhere that anger is anything but one-dimensional: "The arousal of anger clearly has a multifaceted role in human behavior." Even when contemporary standards are applied, therefore, the interpretationes modernae of the final scene of the Aeneid suffer from excessive reductionism.

We should be aware that this particular criticism of Aeneas is nothing new. It was anticipated, though his modern critics do not seem to acknowledge it, by the strictures of Christian writers such as St. Augustine and, especially, Lactantius. In Div. Inst. 5.10–11, Aeneas is faulted sharply for not practicing mercy. Lactantius defines pietas as belonging to those qui bella nesciunt, qui amici sunt inimicis, qui omnes homines pro fratribus diligunt, qui cohibere iram sciunt omnemque animi furorem tranquilla moderatione lenire. Such criteria, of course, are ahistorical and bear little relation to the Roman concept of pietas. In terms of Rezeptionsgeschichte, the return to such views is not surprising after the discovery, in the past twenty years, that the time-honored interpretations of Aeneas as a mere Stoic and proto-Christian are seriously inadequate. We cannot ignore, however, the total absence of any criticism of Aeneas' action in the non-Christian ancient Aeneiskritik, which was rather copious.

Related to this is another consideration which again emerges both from the scholarship on anger and from common sense. Anger is a culture-based phenomenon. Its manifestation, therefore, especially in the specific context of the end of the Aeneid must be considered in the more comprehensive terms of the Greco-Roman, albeit pre-Christian, tradition than within a single, isolated aspect of that tradition, such as Stoicism. Ancient views of anger, as we shall see, were much more diverse. The one-sided use of Stoic doctrine as the only criterion is as unsatisfactory as the opposite pole of the recent scholarly debate, i.e., the argument for "moral ambiguity."

It has become a frequent and increasingly facile resort of

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4 Novaco, op. cit., 3.
interpretations not only of this scene, but of the *Aeneid* in general. The phrase has a good ring to it; it recognizes the modernity of Vergil and appeals to our sensibilities about many contemporary issues. But it is still misapplied (and that refers to many other aspects and scenes of the *Aeneid* as well). The final scene is a microcosm of the epic in that it is complex and has multiple dimensions. While several responses are possible—and that is always the attraction of a classic—it does not drift off into the grey area of moral irresolution. In the end, Aeneas has to make a decision, and clues are freely given that his impassioned action can be considered as unequivocally moral.

Today, it takes a Homeric scholar rather than a Vergilian one to reject the facile escape into arguing for moral ambiguity and to state bluntly that Turnus cuts off the heads of his slain enemies and "suspends them from his chariot dripping blood—"an action reminiscent of the habit of Cacus, the monster of Book 8, who used to fix dripping heads to his doorposts. How anyone can feel strong sympathy for Turnus in his weakness at the end of Book 12 escapes me. The man is a thug." Providing the related Roman perspective, Cicero, in discussing the subject of *clementia* and *parcere subjectis*, reminds us specifically that those who were *crudeles in bello* and *immanes* should not be spared and he singles out Scipio's *debellatio* of Numantia and Carthage as an example (*Off*. 1.35). As Latinus admits, he and his men took up *arma impia* (12.31); the crime was Turnus' who violated the peace (*polluta pace* 7.647). Vergil specifically assigns a place in Tartarus to *quique arma secuti impia* (6.612–13). In further contrast to Aeneas, Turnus abets and rejoices in the wilful breaking of the sacred treaty whose ratification and ritual Vergil builds up in great, deliberate detail in the early part of Book 12. This is the second time Turnus has broken a peace agreement, and the reader of the final scene does not need to be reminded of it. As Servius (*ad Aen*. 12.949) recognized, the death of Turnus results from *ultio foederis rupti*.

From the point of Roman custom, practice, and law the situation is totally unambiguous. Turnus has forfeited his life several times

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over. So far from being a hapless Hector, who remonstrates with Paris for breaking the agreement with Menelaos, he is a breaker of treaties and, therefore, a war criminal.⁹ We know of no occurrence of *clementia* in such a case. The Roman reader would not have been concerned about his capital punishment in the final scene of the epic. It is not the moral ambiguity, but the humanization of this ineluctable scene that is one of Vergil's hallmarks here as elsewhere in the epic.¹⁰ There is an exquisite balance between Aeneas' subjective volition and the objective causation. Neither should be overstressed at the expense of the other. Its fulcrum again is the anger theme. Before we explore its various dimensions, a few more comments are in order on the historical and human context of the final scene.

Another, major aspect of the inevitability of Turnus' death illustrates the mixture of causations. That is his act of *devotio*.¹¹ In the assembly in Book 11, after the grievous losses of the Latins on the battlefield, he vows to sacrifice his own life to restore the *pax deorum* (11.440–42):

\[
\text{vobis animam hanc soceroque Latino} \\
\text{Turnus ego, haud ulli veterum virtute secundus,} \\
\text{devovi.}
\]

He formally pledges that, in case he is defeated—which would be the final indication of the *ira deorum* (11.443)—to assuage that *ira* with his death: *morte luat* (11.444). This *devotio* is reiterated in Book 12, where Turnus resolves to atone for the breach of the *foedus*: *me verius unum/pro votis foedus luere* (12.694–95). It is a formal pledge, and he therefore is not even entitled, quite in contrast to Hector, to asking for his life when he is defeated by Aeneas. His life belongs to the gods and yet he reneges on his pledge.

Again, while the perspective from Roman sacral law and custom is unambiguous, Vergil enlarges the picture to include the human dimension. In Turnus' case, it is his repeated inability, which Vergil portrays with great consistency, to live up to his own ideals and


¹⁰ See below, pp. 341–342.

promises at critical junctures. One scholar defined this as the essence of the tragedy of Turnus. Here, this failure is reinforced by the very phrasing of his plea. He begins with *equidem merui nec deprecor* (12.931)—and yet, what follows is exactly a *deprecatio*. Were the final scene rewritten in accordance with the objections of modern interpreters and their Christian predecessors, the sparing of Turnus would raise more questions than it would answer. In Plato's terminology, Turnus' wrongdoings are "hard to bear and hard to remedy, or even irremediable."

The implicit postulate of modern critics that Aeneas should act without emotion raises similar questions. It would go a long way towards making him precisely into the bloodless Stoic stereotype whose humanity would be less than compelling. Instead, Vergil emphasizes the humanity of his hero. It is reinforced by the dilemma into which Vergil plunges him even at the end of the *Aeneid* and conversely, without the humanization of the scene there would be no dilemma. Though Turnus' case is devoid of merit, Aeneas is susceptible to Turnus' plea to have pity on his father Daunus and he responds with a humane hesitation. The contrast with Turnus' utter rejection of Latinus' same plea earlier in Book 12 is intentional.

When he administers the punishment, Aeneas is not a cold-hearted *Amtsperson* who puts Turnus in his place by citing the appropriate section of the *Römische Staatsrecht*, but he resolves the dilemma on the human level by giving way to his anger over Turnus' brutal killing of Pallas. As Hans Peter Stahl has put it so aptly, Aeneas is not a Kantian hero whose morality is based on a concept of cool-headed duty which excludes emotional consent, but he is a "flesh-and-blood character who is able to experience the immediate appeal of justice violated or unfulfilled."

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13 *Laws* 731B; see below, pp. 329–330.
14 12.43–46; see below pp. 341–342. Clausen (n. 8) 89 notes the Lucretian parallel (3.521–522) for the terminology of disease and healing (*flectitur . . . aegrescitque medendo*; 12.46). Plato's use of those terms in the context of anger and violence also is relevant; see the preceding paragraph with n. 13.
The function of Aeneas’ anger is not ambiguous, but can be elucidated with considerable specificity. So far from being a recidivist phenomenon that puts him on the same level as Juno or Turnus,\(^{17}\) Aeneas’ wrath is a fitting closure which, like the entire epic, is far from being one-dimensional and has several registers of significance. I will illuminate his furor and ira in this scene principally from four perspectives: (1) the role of ira and ὥργη in the judicial context in Greece and Rome; (2) the different philosophical attitudes to anger in antiquity; (3) the function of anger in the Iliad, especially with reference to Achilles; (4) the same with reference to Odysseus and the Odyssey. What will emerge, I hope, is that so far from being a negativistic question mark, this ending is a meaningful conclusion not only to the Aeneid per se, but to the Aeneid as a Roman Odyssey-Iliad.

One aspect that has never been brought to bear on the interpretation of this scene is the role of anger in the administration of justice in Greece and Rome. The testimonia are abundant and speak clearly to the issue.\(^{18}\) In contrast to θυμός, Aristotle (Rhet. 1378a31) defines ὥργη as being specifically oriented towards revenge or punishment.\(^{19}\) Aristotle’s view reflects the realities of life. The Attic orators, especially Demosthenes and Lysias, make it clear that anger is the essential component in the determination of the penalty. The important distinction is that while the judge functions as an arbiter, anger or wrath are not appropriate, but when he is meting out the punishment, he should not do so without ὥργη. In one of the cardinal passages on the subject, Demosthenes (24.118) states that the laws grant to the judges, after they have heard the case, to use anger and, in that spirit, to mete out punishment commensurate to the crime: οἱ νόμοι . . . διδόσασιν αὐτοῖς ἀκόσασαι, ὁποῖον ἀν τι νομίζωσιν τὸ ἀδίκημα,


\(^{19}\) Details below, pp. 332–333; cf. Pseudo-Plato, Def. 415E; Chrysippus fr. III.395 SVF; D. L. 7.113; Philodemus, De Ira, col. 41.32–37 with the comments of C. Wilke on p. li; M. Pohlenz, Hermes 41 (1906) 352–55.
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The quotient of perit to the δικηκτός χρήσθαι τή ὀργή, μέγα μεγάλη, μικρόν μικρά. (cf. Lysias, Contra Érat. 2). The apportionment of the punishment shall be, as Demosthenes frequently states, δεινόν και ὀργής ἄξιον.20 Ὄργη ultimately is used synonymously with punishment;21 hence Lycurgus speaks of ἐσχάτη ὀργή (Contra Leocr. 138) and Aeschines of μέγεθος ὀργῆς (3.197). By contrast, mercy and pity on the part of the punishing judge are denounced as contrary to the law, as is indicated by an Attic psephisma: μηδένα οἰκτίζεσθαι τῶν λεγόντων ὑπέρ τινος.22 Rather, the νομοθέται should ὀργίζεσθαι.23

This concept continues in Rome. A principal aim of the orator in court, according to both Cicero and Tacitus, is to arouse the ira of the judge. So, for instance, Cicero, De Oratore 1.220: orator magnus et gravis (cf. the first simile of the Aeneid, 1.151) cum iratum adversario iudicem facere vellet and Orat. 131: est faciendum ut irascatur iudex; similarly, Tacitus, Dial. 31. Iracundia is defined by Cicero as cupiditas puniendi doloris (De Orat. 1.220; compare Vergil’s characterization of Pallas’ baldric as saevi monimenta doloris). Because of the association with punishment, St. Paul characterizes the last judgment as the day of the coming of ὀργή (1 Thess. 1. 10), the dies irae. Related is the whole tradition of δικαία ὀργή, a phrase that is used, among other instances, by Dio to characterize one of Caesar’s reactions to Pompey in A.D. 52 (40.51.2). Finally, the legitimacy of ira is codified in the Digest: debet irasci.24

To the contemporary Greek and Roman, then, the picture of the avenging Aeneas, who is stirred to anger and meting out punishment in proportion to the crime, would have looked anything but odd or out of place. He is not asked to make a determination of whether Turnus has committed a crime or not; that record is clear. The question is how to punish. To see Aeneas do so without the emotion of anger would have been repugnant to any ancient audience, except for the Stoics. As so much of the Aeneid, the final scene is rooted not in abstract ideology, but in real life, practice, and custom. All the essential aspects mentioned by our relevant sources

20 9.31.3, 19.7.3; cf. 21.34.3, 147.9, 175.4; 24.200.1, 25.94.4, 45.53.4, 54.42.5.
21 Demosth. 21.147.9, 34.19.4; cf. 23.168, 24.218.
22 Hyperides fr. 209 (Baiter/Sauppe); cf. Lycurgus, Contra Leocr. 150.
23 Isocrates 20.3.
24 48.5.30 pr.; cf. 48.24.4: debet enim prope uno ictu et uno impetu utrumque occidere, aequali ira adversus utrumque sumpta.
are present. The punishment should be determined on the basis of the crime; I think we are on safer ground to interpret the phrase *Pallas*te immolat et poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit in this fashion rather than as the reflection of a repressed erotic impulse.\(^{25}\) Capital punishment should be *εἰκάτι ὅργη*. That is what we find here, as well as a reminder of the *ira deorum* which Turnus had so piously once vowed to appease by his death.\(^{26}\)

### III

When it comes to citing moral philosophy on Aeneas' *furor* and *ira*, the tendency has been to concentrate almost exclusively on the Stoics. In the context of the *Aeneid*, however, that is far too schematic; Book 6 alone should teach us something about Vergil's eclecticism. Besides, we should not expect in the *Aeneid*, which thrives on a multiplicity of references, a one-sided treatment of one of the most complex and central human emotions. For that very reason, anger was a major topic of discussion and controversy in all the major philosophical schools. Cicero refers to the ready availability of the relevant tractates in a letter to his brother Quintus (*Ad Q. fr.* 1.1.37), and their number was considerable.\(^{27}\) A brief survey of the major ancient views will highlight their diversity and their importance for a proper understanding of the final scene of the *Aeneid*.

The basic differentiation is already found in Plato. In his scheme, anger, of course, is closely linked and often synonymous with *thymos* (e.g., *Laws* 867D, 868A–C, 868E) and therefore is separate from other, baser appetites and emotions. When reason and appetite are in conflict, the *thymos* may become allied with the former against the latter. For instance (*Rep.* 440D), anger becomes allied with *logos*

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\(^{26}\) See above, p. 324, and for the relation of *devotio* to *ira deum*, Kleinknecht (n. 18) 390.

to protect the individual from wrongs perpetrated by others. When a man believes himself to be wronged, Plato asks, “does not his spirit in that case seethe and grow fierce . . . Does it not fight for what it thinks just? Does it not hold out until it prevails and will not cease in noble persons until it achieves its purpose or dies or is called back and quieted by the reason within?” In short, “just as the state needs a segment of its population to guard against attack from within, so too does the individual need a passionate element (thymos) of the psyche that is roused to anger when he or she is provoked.”

In the Timaeus, where he draws the distinction between the immortal (rational) and mortal (irrational) parts of the psyche, Plato assigns thymos and anger the superior part in the physiological location of the mortal psyche, i.e., above the midriff, in the chest. Being near the head, then, it may be obedient to the rule of reason and may “join with it in controlling and restraining the desires when they are no longer willing of their own accord to obey the command issuing from the citadel” (Timaeus 70A). Throughout this process, anger is linked to logos: Plato goes on to say that when the ἐνος θυμοῦ boils up, logos passes the word around that an unjust action has taken place that affects them (i.e., the limbs; 70B). While anger in itself is not a rational part of the psyche, the immortal or reasoning part of the soul produces the evaluation which is essential to the emotion of anger.

Conversely, Plato realizes that anger can defy reason and lead to rash and cruel deeds when it is out of control. Hence, in the Laws he consistently assigns a higher penalty for crimes committed in anger (e.g., 861A, 868D, 878B) while, following the distinction we noted earlier, he does not dispute the legitimate anger of the nomotheteis (927D). And he specifically singles out the instances which call for the passionate response and anger of any individual. They are directly applicable to the disputed scene in the Aeneid. “Every man,” Plato says, “ought to be at once passionate and gentle in the highest degree. For . . . it is impossible to escape from other men’s wrongdoings, when they are cruel and hard to remedy, or even wholly irremediable, other than by victorious fighting and self-defense, and by punishing most rigorously; and this no soul can achieve without noble passion” (Laws 731B). Wrongdoing, Plato

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28 Averill (n. 3) 78.
continues, mostly comes from ignorance; hence, if the wrongdoer can be cured, "it is permissible to show pity . . . and to abate one's passion and treat him gently, and not keep on raging like a scolding wife; but in dealing with the man who is totally perverse and wicked and cannot be entreated one must give free course to wrath (τῷ δ' ἀκράτως καὶ ἀπαραμυθήτως πλημμελεὶ καὶ κακῷ ἐφιέναι δεὶ τὴν ὀργήν). Therefore we affirm that it is fitting that the good man should be both passionate (θυμοειδή) and gentle each time." (731D)

Plato's criteria fit Aeneas' conduct. Throughout the epic's second half, Vergil has carefully delineated the essence of Turnus' character as χαλεπός, δυσίατος, or even ἀνίατος;30 that is the deeper reason for his death. That death is the result of his wrongdoings (ἀδικήματα), and Aeneas is entitled to pour out his anger (cf. with Plato's phrase irarum effundit omnes habenas 12.499). Measured by the criteria of one of the greatest ancient philosophers, Aeneas' behavior is appropriate and irreproachable. He is both passionate and gentle; the deaths of Turnus and Lausus are good examples. That Plato's views survived in Rome is clear from Cicero's Academica 2.135. There, in an anti-Stoic context, Cicero states that illi (i.e., the Old Academy) quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant permotiones istas animis nostris datas . . . ipsum iracundiam fortitudinis quasi ctem esse dicebant.31

The views of Aristotle and the Peripatetics are very important for the Aeneid. Aristotle had a considerable direct influence on later moral teachings on anger. Because he formalized the distinction between actions and passions as fundamental modes of behavior, he profoundly influenced later theories of emotion; hence Cicero, in the Tusculans and De Officiis, spends much of his time arguing with the Peripatetic views on affects. Aristotle's definition of anger in Rhet. 1378a30–32 was taken over with only slight modifications by the Stoics and Epicureans.32 Besides discussing anger in his extant works, Aristotle devoted a whole treatise to that emotion.33 Chrysippus responded to Aristotle with his treatise περὶ παθῶν, which in turn

30 A particularly striking example is 12.45–46; haudquaquam dictis violentia Turni/ flectitur; exsuperat magis aegrescitque medendo. Turnus' reaction is set in deliberate contrast with Aeneas' in the final scene; see below, pp. 341–342; cf. notes 13 and 14, above.
32 See n. 19.
33 περὶ παθῶν ὀργῆς (D. L. 5.23). For various explanations of the title, see Fortenbaugh (n. 27) 215.
became a basic text for the other writers on the subject. Furthermore, later Roman law incorporated many of Aristotle’s ideas on the responsibility for acts committed during emotion. And finally, the Aristotelian view of tragedy can be fittingly applied to Turnus, as has been done by M. von Albrecht. It is appropriate, therefore, to summarize Aristotle’s views on anger and their application to the Aeneid at somewhat greater length than those of other moral philosophers.

Echoing Plato’s Timaeus, Aristotle in De Anima 403a29–31 depicts anger as affecting body and soul. He characterizes anger both as a boiling of blood in the area of the heart and as a goal-directed desire to return pain for pain. Proceeding from there, Aristotle delineates with considerable nuance the ethical and rational, not to say cognitive, aspects of anger especially in two extensive discussions in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric.

In NE 1149a25–1149b27 he emphasizes that lack of restraint with respect to anger is less blameable than is lack of restraint with respect to other emotions and appetites. He gives four reasons for this, all of which can be applied to the final scene of the Aeneid. First, anger is based on a judgment (λόγος), and to be overcome by such a judgment, even if wrongly at times, is less blameable than to be overcome by appetite (ἐπιθυμία). The example Aristotle cites is that we have been insulted or slighted; the situation with which Aeneas deals is much more profound, involving, besides the aspects I mentioned earlier, the Roman concept of fides toward Evander and Pallas, and Turnus’ slighting the gods by keeping Pallas’ baldric. Secondly, anger is more “natural” than is a desire for excessive and unnecessary pleasures. Nobody would argue that Aeneas engages in a pleasurable act. Thirdly, anger is an open response, and not crafty

34 See e.g., M. Pohlenz, Hermes 41 (1906) 352–55. He also adverts to the importance of Chrysippus’ treatise Θεραπευτικός which influenced such works as Plutarch’s De irda cohibenda.


37 The topic is discussed from various perspectives by P. Aubenque, Rev. Philos. 147 (1957) 300–317; Fortenbaugh, op. cit. (n. 29) and Arethusa 2 (1969) 163–85; Averill (n. 3) 79–82. On the passage in De Anima see also W. R. F. Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory (Oxford 1968) 74–75.

and dissimulating. It is good to keep this in mind when one reads critics who insist that Aeneas, if he needs to kill Turnus, at least should do it with less emotion. And fourth, anger is accompanied by pain (e.g., due to the provocation) and is not engaged in simply for the pleasure of it. Hence, of course, the Vergilian emphasis on the balteus as saevi monimenta doloris and the de-emphasis of personal motive: Pallas te immolat.

Acknowledging the importance of Aristotle's theories in Rome, Cicero polemicizes against the Peripatetics in De Officiis (1.89) and Tusc. 4.43–44 because they praise anger and maintain that ad summan utilitatem esse . . . a natura datum. He probably had in mind the extensive passage in Aristotle's Rhetoric where Aristotle describes for the prospective orator the conditions under which various emotions may be aroused in an audience. It has been well recognized that, so far from being limited to the immediate context of rhetorical practice, his discussion is intended to be more widely applicable. He defines ὀρυγή “as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to an apparent revenge for an apparent slight which was directed, without justification, towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one's friends” (1378a30). The definition, and Aristotle's ensuing comments (1378b–1380a), again can be applied directly to the anger of Aeneas.

First, with regard to the provocation, Aristotle means by ὀλυγωρία especially any kind of contempt (dismissing something as unimportant) or insolence (doing or saying things to cause another shame simply for the pleasure of it). Apply this to Turnus' killing of Pallas: the contemptuous and inhumane treatment of the corpse and the despoliation, which are exacerbated by his gloating and his expressed wish that Evander could be present to see the killing and the taking of the armor (10.490ff.). While Turnus is justified in killing Pallas on the battlefield—albeit viribus imparibus, as Vergil editorializes (10.459)—there is no justification for his insolent treatment of the slain enemy. In terms of Aristotle's moral philosophy (1378b23–28), Turnus commits hybris because of the inordinate pleasure he derives from killing Pallas; Aeneas' treatment of Lausus forms a deliberate contrast. Applicable also is the proviso of acting in revenge for a slight inflicted on one's friends; the relevant aspects of pietas and fides, especially vis-à-vis Evander, have been pointed out often enough and add a deeper Roman dimension.

Secondly, Aristotle says the revenge must be conspicuous so that the offender can see that he is being punished for his slight
(1380b20). This is yet another reason for the overt nature of Aeneas' avenging anger. That such views had a strong following is clear from Cicero's debating them at length. In this context (esp. Tusc. 4.43–44) he highlights his summary of the Peripatetic views by saying virum denique videri negant qui irasci nesciet, eamque quam lenitatem nos dicimus, vitioso lentitudinis nomine appellant. Cicero here refers to NE 1108a10, an important passage to which we will return shortly. And he bristles at the Peripatetic notion that anger is the whetstone of bravery (cotem fortitudinis) and that such perturbationes are considered non modo naturalis . . . sed etiam utiliter a natura datas (4.43).

Thirdly and along these lines, Aristotle considers the character of the angry individual to be very important, in the sense that the intensity of his anger should be appropriate to the situation, the provocation, and the person against whom the anger is directed. Anger and, for that matter, other feelings, he says in NE 1106b20–24, may be experienced “either too much or too little, and in both cases wrongly; whereas to feel these things at the right time, on the right occasion, towards the right people, for the right purpose and in the right manner, is to feel the best amount of them, which is the mean amount—and the best amount is of course the mark of virtue.” He returns to the same distinction (NE 1125b31–32) when he discusses anger specifically. In other words, the response may vary depending, e.g., on different obligations. Again, the relevance of all this to Aeneas' anger is very clear. And as Agathe Thornton has observed, the same—and ultimately Aristotelian—distinction underlies the varied connotations of ira and furor elsewhere in the Aeneid, including furor in battle.39

In the final scene, Aeneas' behavior is almost a textbook illustration of Aristotle's view of anger. Aristotle nowhere says that it is always wrong to be extremely angry40 nor is anger the result of some totally irrational force.41 Quite on the contrary, the virtuous and good-tempered man, while generally not being inclined to anger, would be derelict if he did not become angry and choose revenge under the proper circumstances, especially when an injustice has been committed. In Aristotle's terminology, that would indicate a lack of self-assurance and a slavish disposition (NE 1125b30–

41 Cf. Fortenbaugh (n. 29) 17.
At the other end of the spectrum is the irascible person. Aristotle elaborates at length on the behavior of the persons who are prone to excesses of anger. He concludes that excess is worse than apathy because it occurs more frequently and because the harsh-tempered are worse to live with than the unduly placable (1126a29–30).

In short, "in respect to anger we have excess, deficiency, and the observance of the mean" (NE 1108a4). The three characters of the Aeneid which are in complete conformity with these categories are, respectively, Turnus, Latinus, and Aeneas. Turnus' habitual and maniacal furor is of a totally different kind than Aeneas' ira, whereas Latinus’ ὀφρυνσία (NE 1108a8–9) is foolish (cf. NE 1126a5). Both come to grief: one by his action, and the other by his inaction. By contrast, Aeneas is the type of person whom Aristotle says we praise because "he feels anger on the right grounds and against the right persons, and also in the right manner and at the right moment and for the right length of time" (NE 1125b31–32). His anger involves a strong rational element and "the apprehension and evaluation that some unjustified outrage has occurred."43

Two more details may suffice to illustrate how thorough Vergil's reading of Aristotle was in regard to the topic of anger. Modern critics have gone to great lengths to play up the contrast between Aeneas' compassionate hesitation and his anger. In Aristotle, anger and compassion are linked (Rhet. 1382a14). Hatred and compassion are mutually exclusive, but compassion and anger are not: "One who is angry might feel compassion in many cases, but he who hates does not." Turnus insinuates that Aeneas is acting out of odiis (12.938); the poet clarifies that by having Aeneas be motivated by ira. The distinction made by Aristotle is essential for grasping the point.44 Vergil also follows the preceding argument in the same concluding passage of Aristotle's discussion of anger in the Rhetoric by stressing the association of anger and pain (1832a13); hate, by contrast, is free from pain (cf. Politics 1312b32–34). Aristotle had begun this discussion by quoting Homer's Achilles on the pleasure of revenge-oriented

44 Cicero's distinction (Tusc. 4.21) between ira and odium (odium is ira inveterata) also is relevant here.
anger \((Iliad\ 18.109-110;\ Rhet.\ 1378b6-7)\), but soon discarded the nexus between anger and pleasure. The absence of the connotation of pleasure is, of course, one of the differences between the anger of Aeneas and the anger of Achilles and, for that matter, Turnus. In the Aristotelian sense, then, Aeneas is an example of the morally perfect man.

Aristotle's analysis of anger became the basis of the subsequent fullblown debate of the subject by the major philosophical schools. The principal extant Epicurean text is Philodemus' \textit{De Ira} which is of additional interest because of Vergil's association in his early years with Philodemus.

As could be expected, Philodemus starts off by denouncing anger; it is, after all, incompatible with the Epicurean ideal of \textit{apathia}.\footnote{All citations are from the text of Wilke (n. 19).} He chastises at length those who are habitually angry \((\delta ργίλοι\ 3.23)\) or, to use a distinction made by Cicero \((Tusc.\ 4.12)\), those who engage in \textit{iracundia} rather than \textit{ira}. In that sense, \textit{δργή} is the \textit{sumnum malum} because it is central to all the other passions \((\text{cols. 14 and 15})\). More descriptive detail follows. In the last part of the treatise \((\text{cols. 31-50})\), however, Philodemus turns to the proper attitude the wise man should have towards anger. He recognizes that even the \textit{sophos} become angry on occasion. Philodemus reduces Aristotle's three categories to two: "natural" anger \((φυσική)\) and "vain" anger \((κενή)\). The \textit{ira naturalis} is not an evil: to yield to it is not evil either, but, indeed, good \((38.12-13: \text{οὐ κακὸν ἄλλα καὶ ἀγαθόν})\). Philodemus' main point of contention with the Peripatetics is the latters' more generous definition of \textit{ira naturalis}. Other restraints on \textit{ira naturalis} are that it should be brief and measured \((\text{cols. 40-41, 43.50-45.14, cf. μετρίως 1.20})\). At the same time, Philodemus reiterates the Aristotelian distinction between anger and hatred and the notion that anger, linked as it is to revenge, should not be pleasurable on that occasion \((41.27-42.38)\). The underlying reason is that to the true Epicurean, no slight matters enough to arouse retaliation with \textit{μεγάλας ὀργαῖς} \((42.23)\). The \textit{ira} of the \textit{sapiens}, therefore, cannot be compared to that of most mankind \((42.38-45.14)\).

Evidently, Epicurus' opponents exploited this tendency to have it both ways for its contradictions, blaming him, from the perspective of Aristotle's strictures against \textit{ἄργησια}, for declaring anger as an
infirmity (δοθενή 43.17) on the one hand and yet, on the other, allowing the σοφός to θυμοθέσθαι (45.3). The terms of the debate are restated in Cicero’s Tusculans, which once more attests the liveliness of the ongoing argument (4.20ff.). Philodemus goes on to reject both these criticisms by reference to Epicurus’ writings.

Philodemus summarizes the essence of his position in three epilogismoi at the end of his treatise. Two of these are of direct relevance to the Aeneid. First, it is fitting that the wise man yield to anger when harm is done to him (46.40–47.16). Secondly, the extent to which one’s anger is aroused depends on one’s previous acquaintance with a given harmful occurrence (47.16–39). This is the particular Epicurean version of the long tradition, which we observed in the Greek orators, Plato, and Aristotle that anger includes a cognitive and evaluative component. Anger is shaped by such cognitions and beliefs; Philodemus says that someone previously harmed by lightning, for instance, will vent his anger at lightning, and that kind of anger is not stupid. The wise man, then, will be angry in proportion to the extent of the damage which he knows to result from a certain kind of harm.

The applicability of all this to the final scene of the Aeneid hardly needs extensive comment. In large part, Aeneas’ conduct in that scene and earlier in Book 12 can be accommodated within the Epicurean concept of anger, and an Epicurean probably would not find it objectionable. Yet the hero is, of course, not an Epicurean. In contrast to Venus’ ideal of ἄπαθες in some far-off corner of Italy on the model of Antenor, Jupiter establishes a far more demanding existence for Aeneas (1.230ff.). Relative to Aristotle, Epicurus is less precise about the exact parameters of τὸ μέτρον in regard to anger and, as we have seen, the resulting contradictions invited criticism. Even if the boundaries were not drawn narrowly, Vergil distances himself from Philodemus by having Aeneas be incensed not only by ira but also by furris, something Philodemus considers inappropriate, especially when it concerns revenge for some harm that was done only to a friend (41.14–24). Underlying this rationale is Philodemus’ repeated assertion that nothing in life is of big enough consequence to get excited about unduly (e.g., 48.14–19). Here the ethos of the

46 μανικός οὐκ ἦν ἔλθῃ πάλιν καθ’ ἓνα γέ τινα δακών 41.5–7; but then see Cicero’s dissatisfaction with the definition of μανία and his resulting distinction between insania and furor (Tusc. 3.11). Insania is mentis aegrotatio et morbus (3.8); cf. n. 30, above.
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*Aeneid* is obviously different and leads to a different response on Aeneas' part. One could argue, of course, that precisely because the injustices committed by Turnus matter greatly indeed Aeneas has to transcend the Epicurean injunction against acting with fury in order to be in exact conformity with the *epilogismos* that the response should be proportionate to our knowledge of previous harm coming from such wrongdoing. As always, Vergil likes to explore such boundaries.

No detailed discussion is needed for the Stoics. They, of course, condemned anger unequivocally: *Stoici . . . voluerunt eam* (i.e., *iram*) *penitus excidere* is a sentiment that is attributed already to Chrysippus. Seneca's *De Ira* is a relentless denunciation of the major accepted norms of anger, thus repeatedly confirming that norm, for instance, in the punishment phase of the administration of justice (1.15.3, 16.6, 19.7–8). In his running argument against the Peripatetics, Seneca articulates the standard which Lactantius applied to Aeneas' conduct in the final scene: *irasce pro suis non est pri animi, sed infirmi* (12.5), a polemical response to Aristotle's equation of justified anger with τὸ ἀνδροδέσ. It is totally unsound, however, to posit that Stoic tenets were the prevailing standard for Vergil's audience, for Vergil's own attitudes, and for Aeneas' role. The evidence against such an assumption is considerable.

Both Cicero, who is cited most often as indicating the pertinent Roman attitudes, and Vergil are eclectic. The former occasionally adopts Stoic views, especially in some of his philosophical works. But when it comes to the *veritas* of the *vita activa*, different standards apply. Philosophical argumentation becomes irrelevant, and Stoic orthodoxy in particular turns into a matter of ridicule because of its remoteness from life. For instance: in the passage from *De Oratore* (1.220) we cited earlier with regard to Cicero's sanctioning of the arousal of anger, he refers to the conflicting philosophical definitions of anger as *fervor mentis* or *cupiditas puniendi doloris*. The point, however, is that such philosophical distinctions do not get in the way of the *orator magnus et gravis*. This is followed by a reference to Stoic

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47 SVF III.444. Posidonius considered anger one of the cardinal πάθη; see Cicero, *De Off.* 1.69 and M. Pohlenz, *Antikes Führertum* (Leipzig and Berlin 1934) 45, n. 2 and 52.

48 A typical assertion for which no support is offered is Lyne's (n. 6) 191: "His role is Stoic and imperial, Stoically imperial."

49 See above, p. 327.
orthodoxy about the affects (motus) as contrasted with the views of others who tolerabiliiores volunt esse et ad veritatem vitae propius accedere. The philosophers' books and definitions (descriptiones) are fine for Tusculani requiem atque otium (224); they are not needed by the orator as he works on the animos hominum . . . sensus mentesque (222) and is interested in gauging quid sui cives . . . cogitent, sentiant, opinentur, expectent. The role of the poet of the Aeneid is closer to that of the orator than the philosopher.\textsuperscript{50}

In his actual practice, Cicero found in Cato's unrealistic Stoicism an effective target for securing Murena's acquittal by appealing to the Romans' instinctive admiration for the practical man of action and to their dislike of orthodox ideology. His well-known ridicule of Stoic principles in that speech (60–66) includes their condemnation of anger (62). By contrast, Cicero's teachers are illi a Platone et Aristotele, moderati homines atque temperati (63). Cato is a good and extremely talented man—homo ingeniosissimus (62)—who has honestas, gravitas, temperantia, magnitudo animi, iustitia or, in short, omnes virtutes. His flaw, however, is his following a doctrina non moderata which is hard to endure in reality or for human nature (veritas aut natura; 60). Such a doctrine is fine as a causa disputandi, but not vivendi (62).

It is completely unreasonable to suppose that Vergil's Roman readers would condemn Aeneas' exercise of anger or that Vergil wanted him to be judged by narrow Stoic orthodoxy. Aeneas has all of Cato's qualities without going to the excess of Stoic doctrina.\textsuperscript{51} One further relevant example may suffice to illustrate the well-known fact that Vergil does not simply go by the Stoic textbook. In Tusc. 4.50, Cicero, this time taking the Stoic side, reproaches the Peripatetics by asking: quid? Herculem, quem in caelum ista ipsa, quam vos iracundiam esse vultis, sustulit fortitudo, iratumne censes conlixisse cum Erymanthio apro aut leone Nemaeo? Vergil pointedly responds to Cicero in Aeneid 8. When he characterizes Hercules' battle with Cacus, the terminology is permeated with phrases connoting anger: furiis exar-


\textsuperscript{51} The point is valid despite the obvious jocular element (cf. Fin. 4.74) in Cicero's characterization of Cato; see Kennedy, op. cit., 182–85; A. D. Leeman, Entretiens Fond. Hardt 28 (1982) 216–17, and C. Craig, TAPA 116 (1986) 229–39. In addition there are, of course, Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum; cf. Horace Sat. 1.3, 2.3.
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serat dolor (8.219–220), furens animis (8.228), fervidus ira (8.230), and all with the poet's approbation because Hercules has justice on his side. And since that episode is a mythological paradigm for Aeneas' battle with Turnus, the same words are purposely employed in the final scene of the epic: furiis accensus et ira (12.946), dolor (12.945), fervidus (12.951). At the same time, for reasons which will be immediately apparent, Vergil pointedly calls Hercules non rationis egentem (8.299).

Modern interpreters who use Stoic views for faulting Aeneas for his anger and, at the same time, postulate that he should spare Turnus are, in fact, involved in somewhat of a Stoic paradox. Doctrinaire Stoicism was against forgiveness, and Seneca's attempt to differentiate between clementia and misericordia is post-Vergilian (De Clementia 2.6.4–7.5). Even to an orthodox Stoic, then, the essence of the final scene, i.e., Aeneas' not relenting, was irreproachable. Aeneas is criticized for his anger not by the Stoic Seneca, but by the Christian Lactantius, who had his own reasons. Besides, Aeneas' anger is anything but irrational; Vergil has been at pains to prepare for its justification throughout the second half of the epic. In Stoic doctrine, the link we observed between logos and anger reached its final stage of development. The Stoics held that all affects, including anger, were subject to the control of reason: omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et opinione (Cic., Tusc. 4.14). To indulge in them, therefore, was a wilful act of reason. The Stoics disapproved of using reason in this way, but Vergil did not. Pointedly, he chose to end the Aeneid with a Stoic paradox.

In sum, so far from finding Aeneas' anger repugnant, most of the ancient ethical tradition would find it entirely appropriate and even praiseworthy. After the breach of the foedus earlier in Book 12, Aeneas has every reason to respond with anger. Yet pius and inermis as he is (12.322), he enjoins his army o cohibete iras! (314). Logos, not pathos, guides his planned course of action (314–317):

ictum iam foedus et omnes
compositae leges, mihi ius concurrere soli,
me sinite atque auferte metus; ego foedera faxo
firma manu, Turnum debent haec iam mihi sacra.

Turnus, however, does not cooperate; in Plato's terminology, he is δυσιστος or ἄνιστος (Laws 731B). He irresponsibly avoids Aeneas;
Aeneas makes every effort to track him down and, in the process of so doing, is treacherously attacked by Messapus: \textit{insidiis subactus} (494). At that point, \textit{δοργησια} would be a defect; hence \textit{adsurgunt irae}. This is followed by one more reference to the justification for anger—\textit{laesi foederis} (496)—and then, finally, \textit{irarumque omnis effundit habenas} (499). The phrase echoes the frequent \textit{δοργη\epsilon\nu} in the philosophers. The culmination is his anger in the final scene, which again is preceded by reflection.

In a situation like that the wise man, as defined by the Academics, Peripatetics, and even Epicureans, must act the way Aeneas does. Only narrow Stoic orthodoxy would have him dispense with anger altogether, and such extreme views found little acceptance in actual Roman life.\textsuperscript{52} It is essential for us to read the \textit{Aeneis im Lichte ihrer Zeit}, to use Norden’s phrase, a notion which, not surprisingly, is shared even by those who apply to the \textit{Aeneid} the most current literary theory.\textsuperscript{53} The careless disregard of any discernible methodology in favor of highly subjective individual responses has led to a curiously distorted perspective on the final scene of the \textit{Aeneid}, and from there on the \textit{Aeneid} as a whole, which bears no resemblance to its setting.

\textit{IV}

Closing out the Roman \textit{Iliad-Odyssey} as it does, the end of the \textit{Aeneid} resonates with echoes of the main themes of the Homeric

\textsuperscript{52} Because it so obviously neglects much of the relevant evidence, P. Burrell’s recent article (n. 1) falls far short of demonstrating that “the Roman reader could be expected with slight reservations to condemn it” (i.e., Aeneas’ action) (p. 198). As noted earlier, we do not find a trace of any such condemnations in our Roman sources.

\textsuperscript{53} See G. B. Conte, Virgilio. \textit{Il genere e i suoi confini} (Turin 1984) 39, with reference to \textit{Eclogue} 10 (= English edition by C. Segal (Ithaca and London) 1986) 127: “If we refuse to separate the text from its intentions (which means not ingenuously guessing at the author’s intentions but uncovering the living relationship that linked the text with the world and with its immediate public), the writing of poetry can be seen as a vital use of language in a form brimming with sense.” In an accompanying note (p. 39, n. 40), which unfortunately was left out of the English edition, Conte specifically refers to the importance of philosophical literature for the Augustan culture. For emphasis on historical perspective in literary hermeneutics in general, cf. especially the joint contributions of S. Knapp and W. B. Michaels in W. J. Mitchell, ed., \textit{Against Theory: Literary Studies and the New Pragmatism} (Chicago 1985).
epics. As always, these themes are reworked by Vergil in an extraordinarily meaningful way. The anger of Aeneas is no exception.

It is meant to remind us of the μῆνις of Achilles and its ramifications. It does so by deliberately contrasting with the savage fury Achilles displays when he kills Hector. The evocation of the general theme of Achilles’ anger is more relevant than Achilles’ specific fury in the nominally corresponding scene in the Iliad (22.330–60). Achilles scoffs at the pleas of the dying Hector. He wishes he could hack his meat away, eat it raw, and feed the rest to the dogs and vultures (22.345–54). He has no sympathy, no hesitation; the only comeback Hector has is to warn Achilles that he, Hector, if so treated, will become a θεῶν μῆνια (358), a cause of the wrath of the gods that will be visited upon Achilles at the appointed time.

Plainly, the corresponding scene in the Aeneid could not be more different. Aeneas listens to Turnus’ plea, and it makes him hesitate.54 Humane sensibility and concern are not an ephemeral affair in the Aeneid—in contrast to the end of the Iliad, for example—but an ongoing characteristic of both the epic and its hero. The humanity of the hero, on which we commented earlier, leads to his dilemma, and that dilemma, in turn, reinforces the hero’s humanity. Turnus appeals to Aeneas on purely human grounds—their fathers. Aeneas is susceptible to this kind of appeal as we know from the description of the death of Lausus in Book 10. His response is a humane hesitation, a hesitation which Vergil intentionally contrasts with Turnus’ reaction to a similar appeal at the beginning of Book 12. There the aged king Latinus climaxes his plea to Turnus to set an end to the slaughter and carnage for the sake of his old father: miserere parentis longaevi (43–44). Turnus’ reaction is (45–46):

haudquaquam dictis violentia Turni
flectitur; exsuperat magis aegrescitque medendo.55

By contrast, when Turnus beseeches Aeneas Dauni miserere

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54 Cf. Clausen’s (n. 8) 99 observation: “An extraordinary moment of humanity, for the epic warrior never hesitates.”

55 See notes 14, 30, and 46 for the passage’s epitomizing Turnus’ aegritudo and inability to be healed. The recall of this defect, with its Platonic associations, in the final scene is most purposeful.
The principal reason Vergil chose to work a reminder of the wrath of Achilles into the thematic fabric of the final scene of his epic is precisely that the μήνις of Achilles and its ramifications are rich in their complexity. Achilles' wrath focuses on the conflict between personal integrity and social obligation. The hero depends for approval on the society of his peers, and yet that is precisely the society from which Achilles needs to remove himself to maintain his personal honor. His anger leads to a separation from society and produces a dilemma in that Achilles, by this action, gives up the change of further honor. The killing of Hector resolves one aspect of this dilemma produced by the original μήνις. Outwardly, at least, Achilles returns to the society of peers on which he depends for an external recognition of his honor. But more matters than outward appearances. One indication is that earlier, Achilles rejects the conciliatory offers of Agamemnon and Odysseus because there has been no change of spirit on their part (Iliad 9.375ff.). A related perspective has been defined by James Redfield. He observes astutely that Achilles' anger excludes him from the fabric of culture and goes on to say that "in the story of Achilles, the poet dramatizes a fundamental contradiction: communities, in the interest of their own needs, produce figures who are unassimilable, men they cannot live with and who cannot live with them." The hero's place, therefore, Redfield continues, is in the margins of his society.

How is all this reworked in the Aeneid? The tertium comparationis to which Vergil was no doubt attracted is the aspect of dilemma and the complexity of heroic behavior. Its reassessment by Vergil leads to a concomitant inversion of the anger theme. So far from being at

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the fringes of his society, Aeneas is at its very center.\textsuperscript{58} When he kills Turnus, he acts in behalf of a civilized society for which ἐσχάτη ὀργή under these circumstances, as we saw earlier, is a virtue and not a throwback to primitivism. It is an advanced society into which Turnus cannot be integrated. The reason Turnus excludes himself from that society by his own temper and actions is not even remotely the same as that of Achilles. In contrast to Achilles, Turnus is unassimilable to his society not because of his quest for personal integrity, dignity, or meaning of self, not because he wills and accepts his own death—for he clearly does not—but because his furor has become autonomous and one-dimensional instead of being the problematic means to an end. His furor is maniacal; it lacks the combination of passionate revenge and introspection that is so characteristic of Achilles especially in the supplication scenes.\textsuperscript{59} That is one of the reasons the Aeneid ends with a scene of supplication.

By way of further contrast with the Iliad, the anger of Aeneas, so far from producing a dilemma, resolves one and lends emotional credibility to the cut and dried fact, which Vergil clearly establishes earlier, that Turnus cannot be spared. The validity of Aeneas' action is reinforced by Vergil's evoking the reason for Achilles' refusal of a reconciliation which he knows would be superficial. By the end of the epic, the reader of the Aeneid knows that there will be no change of spirit in Turnus. So far from resolving anything, sparing him would be yet another temporary reprieve of which he has already received more than enough.

The frequent comparison between the end of the Iliad and the end of the Aeneid needs to be informed by a similar perspective. On the surface, the ending of the Iliad seems far more humane and conciliatory. Yet in the end, “nothing has changed. Priam is still Achilles' enemy, and their reconciliation is the fragile product of a fabricated ceremonial context.”\textsuperscript{60} Though outwardly returning to the society of peers on which he depends for his external honor, Achilles is not reconciled with his community. His anger and isolation

\textsuperscript{58} Nor is he a "twelfth-century man" as Williams (n. 1) 223 often puts it to explain away "moral ambiguities."

\textsuperscript{59} Griffin (n. 56) 55.

\textsuperscript{60} Redfield (n. 56) 218; similarly, R. Jenkyns, JRS 75 (1985) 73–74. When Vergil himself recasts the finale of the Iliad (A. 1.485–87), it becomes "a brutal scene, deliberately un-Homeric" (Clausen [n. 8] 17–18).
remain. The final books of the Iliad do not provide for an actual resolution of the dilemma of Achilles’ heroism, but only for an aesthetic and formal completion.

Two major perspectives and contrasts with the end of the Aeneid open up from here. One, stark as it is, the end of the Aeneid deliberately allows for no such detachment. It is not an aesthetic resolution, but a genuine one. It therefore deliberately incorporates the dominant Iliadic themes of wrath and dilemma and invests them with new meaning. Secondly, as several recent interpreters of the Iliad have argued, Achilles passes from the ethic of peer approval to that of individual conscience and responsibility. This individual ethic is transcended once more in the Aeneid by that of social responsibility. That is how the Roman—and not the 12th century—hero Aeneas acts often enough: Italiam non sponte sequor (4.361). But the end of the Aeneid shows that his personal impulse and the higher purpose can ultimately coalesce. Whereas his furor in Book 2, e.g., which Putnam \(^61\) and others believe the end of the epic recalls, was misguided, his furor at the end of epic is not: both the divine will, as indicated by the dea dira, \(^62\) and Aeneas’ own inclination are in concert. The echoes of Book 2, as is the case so often with real or perceived echoes in the Aeneid, are there for the sake of contrast and completion rather than sameness.

Several other thematic reminiscences especially from the Iliad are relevant in this context. One is the function of the very name of Achilles. Akhi-laos is one who both has grief (achos) for the people (laos) and inflicts grief on them. As Gregory Nagy has shown, this thematic duality sums up much of the Iliad. \(^63\) And so it is with Aeneas in the final scene of the Aeneid. He feels dolor for Pallas, one of his people, and he inflicts suffering on others. The description of his anger again is pivotal in this respect: furiis accensus et ira, as several commentators have noted, recalls the phrase used for the dying Dido: subito accensa furore (4.697). Before Turnus’ death, we are reminded of the grief to which she came because of Aeneas—alius Achille.

The final association of Aeneas with anger has yet another

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\(^61\) Putnam (n. 17) 151ff.

\(^62\) Dira was held to derive from deum ira; see n. 65. Divine ira and human ira act in unison.

\(^63\) The Best of the Achaean (Baltimore 1979) 69–83.
meaningful Iliadic dimension. No anger on the part of any other hero than Achilles ever qualifies as μήνις in the entire epic—with one exception. At 13.459–461, μήνις is applied to Aeneas. In a microcosm, the same nexus of μήνις, nobility (ξοθλός), and τιμή, which is typical of Achilles in the macrocosm of the Iliad, is associated with Aeneas here:

βήναι ἐν' Ἁινείαν, τὸν δ' ὅστατον ἔδρεν ὅμιλου
ἐσταότ', ζαί γὰρ Πριάμῳ ἐπεμήνει δίω
οὔνεκ' ἂρ' ἐσθλόν ἐόντα μετ' ἀνδράσιν οὐ τι τίσκεν.

Commenting on these lines, Nagy plausibly suggests that “the nature of the themes attributed to Aeneas in this passage suggests that they are central to another epic tradition—this one featuring Aeneas rather than Achilles as its prime hero.”\(^{64}\) Would a reminiscence of such a tradition not be entirely appropriate at the end of an Aeneid? It also shows that the roots of Aeneas' portrayal as an angry hero may go deeper than is generally assumed.

It is poetically very fitting, then, that the end of the Aeneid should recapitulate the central theme on which the Iliad begins and by which it is permeated, that of μήνις. There is an unbroken line from the first book of the Iliad to the last book of the Aeneid. Additional inversions enhance this aspect. Instead of Achilles, Turnus becomes θεόν μήνιμα. Cognizant of this, he vowed to assuage the ira deum by his death. We are reminded of this deum ira by the appearance of the Dirá near the end of Book 12; an ancient etymology of Dirá was deum ira.\(^{65}\) In contrast to Achilles, Aeneas is the instrument, and not the object, of deum ira. The internal dimension of this ira, Turnus’ demonic and un-Aristotelian mania, sums up his character and his failure in lines that recall the Allecto episode (913–14):

sic Turno, quacumque viam virtute petivit,
successum dea dira negat.

Finally, the preceding scene of Turnus’ throwing the boulder is another variant of the alius Achilles theme. In the Iliad, it is Aeneas

\(^{64}\) *Op. cit.*, 226.

\(^{65}\) For references, see *TLL*, *s.v.* dirus 1268, 36–40; cf. W. Hübner, *Dirae im römischen Epos* (Hildesheim 1970) 9, 12–42.
who tries to smite Achilles in this fashion (20.285–87). This is an inversion of a standard epic situation: usually, the victorious hero is the one who throws a boulder; a good example is Diomedes fighting Aeneas (II. 5.302–310). In the Aeneid, the theme is inverted once more as Turnus uses Aeneas’ Iliadic weapon and fails, thus giving way to his death at the hands of Aeneas/Achilles.

Can we make a similar case for the importance of the anger theme in the Odyssey? Jenny Strauss Clay has recently tried to do so.66 While I am not entirely persuaded by her arguments, some valid perspectives remain and deserve to be explored briefly.

There is a clear Odyssean reminiscence in the next to the last line of the Aeneid when illi solvuntur frigore membra. It is, as so frequently in Vergil, a multiple recall, involving Aeneid 1.92 (Aeneas’ first appearance in the epic), Iliad 22.335 (δεις τοι γούνατα ἔλυοσ—Achilles’ words to Hector), and the phrase Ἄδυνοσής λύτο γούνατα in Od. 5.297 which, of course, underlies A. 1.92. So we are meant to think once more of Odysseus, too. And that turns out to be quite meaningful.

Almost by definition, Odysseus is the man who is given to anger and incurs anger. That is the meaning of ὀδυνοσάμενος in Od. 19.407 when Autolycus gives him his name.67 ὀδυνοσάμενος is in the middle voice, partaking in both the active and the passive mode. Ὕνας ἄγαγῶν explains one of the ancient scholia.68 The bivalency is the same as in Achilles’ name. When Odysseus gives himself a fictitious name, he chooses one that is etymologically related to ἰρα (Sansk. irasya), i.e., Eperitus.69 Significantly, that occurs towards the end of the Odyssey (24.305–306).

 Appropriately enough, the use of ὀδυνοσάσθαι in the Odyssey is consistently limited—with the exception of the Autolycus passage—to denote divine enmity and, more precisely, the anger of the gods against Odysseus.70 The passive endurance of this anger is, of course Odysseus’ hallmark. He is troubled (17.446ff.) not by mortality, as is Achilles, but by the terrible instability of fortune brought on by the anger of the gods. The anger of Poseidon, who shipwrecks Odysseus

67 Detailed discussion and bibliography in Clay, op. cit., 59–68.
70 Clay (n. 66) 63.
until λύτο γοώνατα, is not an example of divine justice. Divine whim, as Clay points out, “may lead to the endurance of misery and suffering; it cannot, however, encourage justice or piety.”71

The reversal of all this in the Aeneid is almost commonplace. The anger of Poseidon becomes the íra of Juno. But there is Providence; justice and piety exist and are noble goals. The Odyssean reminiscence, filtered as it is through Aeneid 1.92, points both to the human endurance, as suggested by Homer, of misguided deum íra and to the stable order which overcomes that íra: while Aeneas would have drowned undeservedly, Turnus dies justly. He dies as a result of anger, an anger full of transmuted Achillean and Odyssean reminiscences, but the anger of Aeneas is a world apart from Juno’s.

Finally, just as there was the contrast between the end of the Iliad and the end of the Aeneid, so is there a deliberate contrast between the end of the Aeneid and the end of the Odyssey. Again, anger plays an important role. At the very end of the Odyssey, Odysseus and his men set upon the suitors’ relatives with martial ferocity. Athena gives Odysseus μένος (520). Similarly, íra is a necessary concomitant of battle in the Aeneid.72 Then Athena orders everybody to stop, but Odysseus rears up and is ready to pounce on the fleeing enemies. Only a thunderbolt from Zeus—that is one way to end an epic—makes him stop. Athena enjoins him with παῦε . . . νεῖκος . . . πολέμοιο (543), so that Zeus will not be angry at him (κεχολώσεται 544). And, the poet goes on to say, Athena persuaded him—one is reminded of her persuasion of Achilles in Iliad 1; the last lines of the Odyssey fittingly harken back to the first book of the Iliad. Moreover, Odysseus was glad about it—χαίρε δἐ θυμῷ (545). The Aeneid, by contrast, has no such happy ending. Anger, so far from being prohibited by Jupiter, is sanctioned by him, as befits the ethic of the world of the Aeneid which centers on divine justice and not merely survival by human wits.

V

The two major perspectives from which I have analyzed the end of the Aeneid are central to the entire epic. Being, as R. D.

71 Op. cit., 229. On the larger picture, see now Jenkyns (n. 60) 63–66.
72 Thornton (n. 11) 160.
Williams put it, "essentially an exploration of varying and sometimes contrasting aspects of the human experience,"73 the Aeneid deals with values and morality. Hence the Greco-Roman tradition of moral philosophy and ethics is indispensable for a proper assessment of a cardinal emotion such as anger. Besides, we have Donatus' statement that upon the completion of the Aeneid, Vergil was going to devote the rest of his life to philosophy (Vita Vergili 126). Secondly, there is the "designed intertextuality"74 of the Aeneid and the Homeric epics, which thoroughly informs Vergil's utilization and transformation of basic Homeric themes, and anger is a stellar example.

The final scene is yet another illustration that the Aeneid does not present abstract ideals but was meant to be true to Roman life. This truthfulness or Roman realism is ennobled precisely by the poetic richness of Vergil's allusions to both the philosophical and the Homeric traditions. We can see all these characteristics at work in the epic's finale which thereby becomes extraordinarily meaningful, more meaningful, certainly, than most contemporary interpreters would allow.

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73 Antichthon 1 (1967) 40.

74 For some precise remarks on this term, see now the English edition of Conte (n. 53) 29, n. 11. Compare Michael Putnam's stimulating remarks on arma virumque and the role of μὴ νέως in his review of Conte in this journal (108 [1987] 789-90). The Aeneid begins and ends with thematic allusions to both Iliad and Odyssey.